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Abstract
This article analyzes the effects of intellectual property rights in a quality-
ladder model in which incumbent firms preemptively innovate in order to keep
their position of leadership. Unlike in models with leapfrogging, granting non-
expiring forward protection reduces the rate of innovation and imposing a non-
obviousness requirement reduces R&D spending. It is shown that full protection
against imitation, granted independently of the size of the lead, maximizes the
average innovation rate. (JEL L40, O31, O34)
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1 Introduction
This article studies the effects of different intellectual property right (IPR) policies
in a quality-ladder model.1 In contrast to most models of this type, where entrants
undertake all R&D, so that there is leapfrogging, this article analyzes the case in which
incumbent firms innovate preemptively in order to prevent being replaced by entrants,
and in which there is persistence in leadership.
Empirical studies show that incumbent firms who remain the industry leaders for
a sustained period of time carry out a considerable number of innovations. Malerba
and Orsenigo (1999), Cefis and Orsenigo (2001) and Cefis (2003) find that persistent
innovators account for a disproportionate share of all patent applications, and Peters
(2009) documents large persistence in innovation behavior at the firm level.2 Given
that intellectual property rights (IPRs) are used to stimulate innovation, it is therefore
important to understand how they should be designed in order to encourage cumula-
tive innovation in a context where a large fraction of innovations are carried out by
incumbent firms.
The following model setup is used in order to generate persistent leadership: There
is free entry into R&D, and the R&D productivity of entrants and incumbents is the
same. Contrary to most leapfrogging models, it is assumed that the R&D technology
is characterized by decreasing returns at the industry level and that the incumbent
moves first in the R&D game.3 By increasing her own R&D effort, the incumbent
can therefore decrease the profitability of R&D undertaken by entrants and preempt
entry. It is assumed that an incumbent who has undertaken two successive innovations
(is two steps ahead) can charge the unconstrained monopoly price and earns larger
1This setting seems appropriate as innovation continuously improves the quality or reduces the
costs of existing goods in many industries, implying a process of creative destruction during which
old innovations are displaced by new ones. For examples of cumulative innovation, see Scotchmer
(2004), Chapter 5.
2Malerba and Orsenigo (1999) find that the percentage of patents granted between 1978 and 1991
to firms that had already innovated within their sector was 70% in Germany, 60% in France, 57%
in the UK, 39% in Italy, 68% in the USA and 62% in Japan. Foster and Grim (2010) show that
there was high persistence among the top 200 R&D performing firms in the US between 1976 and
2003. In a survey article, Bartelsman and Doms (2000) report that only around one-quarter of total
factor productivity growth of US manufacturing establishments over a ten year period resulted from
net entry and exit, while about half of it was due to within-plant growth. Foster, Haltiwanger and
Krizan (2001) reach similar conclusions. Akcigit and Kerr (2010) find that large (incumbent?) firms
undertake more incremental R&D directed at improving their existing product lines, while smaller
firms focus more on drastic innovations that lead to the introduction of new products.
3Even without the latter assumption, a similar Walrasian equilibrium can be considered, as ex-
plained in footnote 24.
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profits than an entrant who has to compete with the previous incumbent in the product
market. Due to the Arrow replacement effect, the incumbent, however, has less stand-
alone innovation incentives than an entrant. As entrants value entry (which brings a
one step lead) less than the incumbent values not being replaced and keeping her (two
step) lead, the incumbent preempts entry and carries out all R&D in equilibrium.4
The analysis builds on a simplified version of Denicolo` (2001), who introduces the
preemption mechanism of Gilbert and Newbery (1982) into a quality-ladder growth
model, but does not study the role of intellectual property rights. In equilibrium, the
amount of R&D that the incumbent undertakes in order to prevent being replaced
depends positively on the value of an innovation for an entrant expecting to become
the new leader upon entry. The prediction that incumbents invest more in R&D if
entry pressure increases is supported by an empirical study of Czarnitzki, Etro and
Kraft (2011), who use a dataset and a survey from the German manufacturing sector.
Within this setting of persistent leadership, the following IPR policies are ana-
lyzed: (i) forward protection (new innovations infringe the IPRs (patents) of previous
innovators), (ii) a non-obviousness requirement (minimal inventive step), and (iii) pro-
tection against imitation (duration until rivals can copy a protected technology). The
analysis generates three main results:
First, granting non-expiring forward protection reduces the innovation rate.5 Under
forward protection, entry is discouraged as incumbents can block entrants’ innovations.
Even if forward protection allows incumbents and entrants to collude in prices, entrants
never obtain larger profits than without forward protection and without collusion.
Therefore, granting forward protection of infinite duration unambiguously reduces
entry pressure and the equilibrium rate of innovation. This result differs from that
obtained by O’Donoghue and Zweimu¨ller (2004), who study forward protection in the
leapfrogging case. In their setting, patents for any two succeeding innovations are held
by different firms so that equilibrium profits can be increased through collusion (which
is not possible in case of persistent leadership where the incumbent already enjoys the
maximal possible unconstrained monopoly profits). While forward protection also
discourages innovation by leading to more backloaded profit flows in the leapfrogging
context, its overall effect on growth can still be positive if the profit-increasing effect
4Entry can, however, occur if patents have expired, if there is collusion, or if innovations are
drastic.
5In the case where consumers have unit demand, maximizing the innovation rate also maximizes
welfare.
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of collusion is larger than this backloading effect.
Extending on the first result, the case is analyzed where forward protection is only
granted for a limited time span, while protection against imitation continues to be
granted for an infinite duration. This means that courts become more lax over time in
protecting IPR holders against follow-on innovations but always grant full protection
against mere imitation. In this case, the rate of innovation falls when forward protec-
tion is granted, but increases once it has expired, as innovators anticipate being better
protected against future entry. Given that forward protection allows the blockage of
entry but does not facilitate collusion, the average innovation rate is maximal if in-
novators are granted forward protection of intermediate duration. This result has not
been shown in the previous literature and also extends to the case of leapfrogging.6
With persistent leadership, the average innovation rate can be increased if entering
firms are granted forward protection of longer duration than the forward protection
granted to incumbents.
The second main result is that imposing a non-obviousness (patentability) require-
ment reduces R&D spending. The reason for this is that such a requirement, given
that it is binding for entrants, reduces entry pressure and therefore the amount of
R&D the incumbent needs to undertake in order to preempt entry. If the requirement
is only imposed on incumbents who have reached the maximal lead, it has no effect on
their R&D spending, but can be useful in order to avoid inefficiently small inventive
steps. These results differ from those obtained in the context of leapfrogging, where
imposing a non-obviousness requirement can increase the innovation rate and welfare
by avoiding an excessive rate of turnover, low markups, and inefficiently small inven-
tive steps (see O’Donoghue (1998), O’Donoghue and Zweimu¨ller (2004), and Hunt
(2004)).
The third main result is that full protection against imitation for any size of the lead
maximizes the average innovation rate. In order to allow for less than full protection,
it is assumed that with a certain hazard rate, competitors can copy a given invention,
enter the market, and compete away all profits. As in Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012),
the general case of state-dependent IP protection is considered in which the rate at
which protection against imitation expires can depend on the size of the lead of an
IP holding firm. Unlike in Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012), however, the (average)
6If, however, protection against imitation expires at the same time as forward protection, granting
finite protection cannot increase the average innovation rate compared to the case where there is no
forward protection but infinite protection against imitation.
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innovation rate is not maximal under state dependent IP protection, but rather in
the case of full uniform protection, i.e. if protection never expires. If, however, IP
protection is already sufficiently weaker for firms with a one step lead compared to
those with a two step lead, further weakening it can, at a certain threshold value,
increase the average innovation rate by inducing these firms to do more R&D than
needed to preempt entry.
The analysis is extended to study various interesting additional issues:
If there is trade secrecy in the sense that entrants have to incur some fixed catch-
up costs before they can use the state-of-the-art R&D technology, it is shown that
incumbents can preempt entry without doing any R&D. In this case, the equilibrium
innovation rate is zero in the case of full IP protection (against imitation). If, how-
ever, IP protection expires with a positive probability, so that incumbents lose their
lead from time to time, this regularly creates a neck and neck situation with positive
innovation incentives where firms try to become the next leader. Because of that, the
average innovation rate is maximal for an intermediate probability of IP expiration.
This result can also be obtained in the case where incumbents can make ex ante agree-
ments with potential entrants in order to reduce R&D spending, or if they can employ
researchers in areas unrelated to R&D.
In the case where two R&D stages must be completed in order to obtain an in-
novation, where the first of which consists of discovering an intermediate R&D input,
the innovation rate is maximal if entrants are allowed to obtain IP protection on
intermediate R&D inputs while incumbents are not.
The article is structured as follows: In Section 2, the related literature is reviewed,
and in Section 3, the model is introduced and the equilibrium is derived. In Section
4, it is shown that permitting entrants and incumbents to collude in prices encourages
innovation and that the equilibrium innovation rate is even higher if there is ”extended
lagging breadth”, which grants the most recent innovator blocking power over the IPRs
of previous innovators. Section 5 studies the effects of protection against replacement.
It is shown that the rate of innovation decreases if entrants have to pay fees upon entry
in order to compensate the previous innovator (Section 5.1 ). Moreover, the effects of
forward protection of infinite duration (Section 5.2 ) and finite duration (Section 5.3 )
are discussed. Section 6 analyzes the effects of imposing a minimal inventive step and
Section 7 the case of state dependent protection against imitation. Several extensions
are analyzed in Section 8. Section 9 concludes. Proofs are collected in Appendix 1.
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In the main part of the article, a partial equilibrium model is analyzed, and the
simplifying assumption is made that increasing the lead beyond two steps does not
lead to larger profit flows. In the supplementary Appendix 2, the more general case of
an endogenous growth model (based on Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)) is analyzed in
which also incumbents with a two step lead can increase profit flows by doing follow-on
R&D. In this setting, the effects that IP policies have on the rate of growth are mainly
the same as those that they have on the rate of innovation in the simplified model (see
the summary in Section 8.3 ).
2 Related literature
The question of how antitrust policies should be designed in innovative industries where
entrants expect to become the next incumbents is analyzed by Segal and Whinston
(2007), who find that entrants should be well protected against incumbents in most
cases in order to guarantee that profit flows for successful innovators do not become too
backloaded. They therefore identify the same effect as O’Donoghue and Zweimu¨ller
(2004), who show that innovation increases if profit flows become more frontloaded.
Chu (2009) studies a generalized version of the model of O’Donoghue and Zweimu¨ller
(2004) and quantitatively estimates the effect of blocking patents on R&D using US
data. He finds that eliminating blocking patents would increase the steady-state R&D
share of GDP by at least 10%. While Chu (2009) and the other articles do not analyze
which policy can be used to obtain the maximal level of frontloading, the present
article shows that it can be obtained through extended lagging breadth. O’Donoghue,
Scotchmer and Thisse (1998) analyze the role of forward protection in a quality-ladder
model with leapfrogging and compare the case of short and broad to long and narrow
patents, assuming that forward protection allows firms to collude and that investment
opportunities arrive at an exogenous rate.7
While most of the above-mentioned articles are concerned with the effects of for-
ward protection, they (unlike this article) do not consider the case where forward
protection expires (potentially earlier than protection against imitation) and where
7Bessen and Maskin (2009) and Llanes and Trento (forthcoming) analyze models of sequential
innovation in which patents grant blocking power over follow-on innovations and in which licensing
is inefficient due to asymmetric information. Assuming that firms can appropriate some surplus in
the final goods markets even in the absence of IP protection, they show that innovation can be larger
when there is no (forward) IP protection. In both articles, it is assumed that innovation does not
lead to the replacement of the previous technology, so that issues like the Arrow replacement effect
or the possibility of preemption that arise in a quality-ladder context are not considered.
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the innovation rate fluctuates over time.
The main difference between the above-mentioned and the present article is that
the former do not study the case in which incumbents undertake R&D.8 While several
articles have analyzed the conditions under which (some) persistence in leadership
can arise in quality-ladder models9, the role of IPR protection has only received little
attention in settings in which incumbent firms also innovate.
Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) analyze a model of step-by-step innovation in which
there is a race between two firms in each sector and where the laggard first has to catch
up through duplicative (but non-infringing) R&D before he can undertake frontier
R&D (unless there is compulsory licensing of the leading edge technology). They
argue that IP protection should be stronger for firms that have a larger technological
lead over their rivals. In their model, IP protection affects innovation by affecting the
incremental profits that the two incumbent firms obtain from moving one step ahead
and it is assumed that parameters are such that the laggard never stops innovating
and never drops out of the market. Reducing IP protection solely for firms with a
smaller lead can therefore increase innovation incentives for laggards and the rate
of innovation by increasing incremental profits. In contrast, there is free entry into
(frontier) R&D in the model analyzed here, and reducing IP protection in a state-
dependent way comes at the cost of reducing the value of entering and the amount of
R&D incumbents need to undertake in order to preempt entry. This entry-discouraging
effect is so strong that, contrary to Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012), who do not allow for
entry, reducing IP protection in a state-dependent way always reduces the (average)
innovation rate compared to the case of full uniform IP protection. These results are
8Segal and Whinston (2007) also study the case of innovation by leaders but do not analyze patent
policies in this context.
9In most quality-ladder growth models (like Aghion and Howitt (1992)), the case of leapfrogging
is analyzed, although incumbents are actually indifferent about their share in total R&D if the R&D
sector is competitive and markets are Walrasian, so that there might as well be some persistence in
leadership (see Cozzi (2007)). In many continuous-time patent race models (like Reinganum (1983
and 1985)) where marginal R&D costs are increasing at the firm-, but not at the industry level,
preemption is not possible and incumbents invest less in R&D than challengers in the standard case
with simultaneous moves and drastic innovations. In a similar setup with fixed costs of entering the
R&D sector, Etro (2004) finds that in the case where there is free entry and industry leaders move
first in the R&D game (are Stackelberg leaders), they do more R&D than entrants so that there is
some persistence in leadership. Denicolo` (2001), on which the current article builds, analyzes the case
where preemption is possible due to decreasing R&D productivity at the industry level and finds that
there is persistent leadership if innovations are non-drastic and incumbents move first. Fudenberg,
Gilbert, Stiglitz and Tirole (1983) analyze the conditions under which preemption is possible and
when there can be competition in patent races.
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derived analytically, while Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) obtain most of their results
through numerical simulations.
Hopenhayn and Mitchell (2011) analyze a model with two innovators in which the
duration of (forward) patent protection (preferential treatment) granted to a firm can
depend on the whole innovation history. They find that the optimal level of protection
is an increasing function of the past innovation success of a firm. Such backloading of
rewards is optimal as it allows to encourage multiple innovations (early and late ones)
at once. The authors show that the optimal policy can lead to a situation in which
one firm is granted infinite protection over the whole quality ladder. Contrary to this
article, the authors assume that inventment opportunities arrive at an exogenous rate,
that preemption is not possible and that there is no Arrow replacement effect, so that
(for a given strength of patent protection) innovation incentives do not depend on the
size of a firm’s lead.
Denicolo` and Zanchettin (forthcoming) study a growth model with non-drastic
innovations and constant returns to R&D in which incumbents and entrants simul-
taneously decide about the sizes of their R&D investments and in which there is no
preemption. Unlike the present article, they assume that the R&D productivity of
incumbents is larger than that of entrants so that incumbents might find it profitable
to innovate, in spite of the Arrow replacement effect. They find that there can be
stochastic leadership cycles, meaning that incumbents are not replaced immediately,
but undertake some R&D and (on average) advance to a certain lead before they are
replaced. The authors show that requiring successful outsiders to pay a licensing fee
to the previous incumbent in this setting can increase the rate of growth, even if such
forward protection does not facilitate collusion. Introducing state-dependent patent
breadth is shown to affect the share of R&D the incumbent undertakes, but it has no
effect on the rate of growth.10
Horowitz and Lai (1996) and Cadot and Lippman (1995) also find an inverted-U
relation between patent length (capturing the strength of protection against imitation)
and the (long run) rate of innovation in the case where there is a monopoly innovator.
However, they simply assume that only one firm (the incumbent) is capable of doing
R&D, while in this article a similar result is derived in a setting where entrants can
10Other articles in which (some) persistence in leadership results because incumbents are assumed to
be more productive in doing R&D than entrants are Segerstrom and Zolnierek (1999) and Segerstrom
(2007). Acemoglu and Cao (2010) assume that only incumbents are capable of undertaking incre-
mental innovations, while only entrants can attain radical innovations.
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also do R&D, but where incumbents can preempt entry without innovating themselves
in equilibrium.
3 The model setup
There is a good, the quality of which can be increased (or the production costs of which
can be reduced) step-by-step through innovation. There exist generations i ∈ {1, ..., k}
of the good. Time is continuous and (gross11) profit flows of a firm producing the
newest generation k of the good depend on whether the firm has IP protection on
it and on how far it is ahead of its rivals. If generation k is not protected by IPRs,
everyone is allowed and able to produce it, and Bertrand competition pushes prices
down to marginal cost. Profit flows are therefore zero in this neck-and-neck case where
no firm has a lead over its rivals:12 ⇡0 (k) = 0. If a firm has IP protection on generation
k, and another firm has IP protection on generation k − 1 or if generation k − 1 is
in the public domain, there is limit pricing, meaning that firm k charges a price that
is low enough to push firms k − 1 out of the market. In this case of a one step lead,
profit flows are given by ⇡1 (k). If the leading firm has IP protection on generations
k and k − 1 of the good, it is assumed to have enough market power to be able to
charge the unconstrained monopoly price, meaning that a rival firm that can produce
generation k − 2 of the good does not find it profitable to enter and to undercut the
monopoly price the leader charges. Therefore, leaders profit flows are the same if they
lead by two or more steps (the latter being the case if the leader has IP protection on
more than the two most recent versions of the good) and are given by ⇡2 (k) > ⇡1 (k).
In order to simplify the analysis, it is assumed that profit flows only depend on
the size of the lead, and not on k, meaning that they are independent of the absolute
quality of the good:13 ⇡1 (k) = ⇡1, ⇡2 (k) = ⇡2. The more general case of profit flows
that increase in k is analyzed in Appendix 2. It is assumed that ⇡1 ≥ ⇡22 (Assumption
11R&D expenditures are not yet subtracted from these profits.
12The subscript denotes the size of the lead.
13Such profit flows can be obtained as equilibrium outcomes in the following setup: consumers have
unit demand, and the utility they derive from consuming the good (and which defines their maximal
willingness to pay) is equal to its quality. Each innovation increases the quality of the good by the
amount ⇡1, and marginal production costs are assumed to be zero so that profits of firms with a
one step lead are equal to ⇡1. Due to limited IP (patent) breadth, a competitive fringe is allowed
to supply copies of the newest good that are of inferior quality and/or are associated with higher
marginal production costs. IP breadth is now assumed to be such that monopolists with a lead of
two or more steps never charge a price in excess of ⇡2 in order to prevent entry of the competitive
fringe (⇡2 could also be interpreted as a cap on prices).
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1), so that incremental profits that a firm obtains when it introduces a new generation
k + 1 of the good (weakly) decrease in the size of the lead that the firm has for
generation k of the good. For entrants (who make zero profits before innovating),
incremental profits are given by ⇡1, and are (weakly) larger than those of incumbents
with a one step lead, which are given by ⇡2 − ⇡1 ≤ ⇡1, and which are again larger
than incremental profits of an incumbent who already has a two step lead, as those
are equal to zero.14
Time is continuous, and the rate of interest is exogenous and given by r. All firms
are risk neutral and not financially constrained.
An inventor of a new generation of the good gets IP protection on it, allowing her
to exclude others from producing her generation of the good. In the first part of the
analysis, IP protection is assumed to be of infinite duration (e.g. patents are infinitely
lived).
3.1 R&D
Given k is the newest generation of the good, the next generation k+1 can be invented
if R&D is undertaken.15 In order to obtain the innovation with the instantaneous
arrival rate φ, the total (industry) costs
C(φ) =
(
cφ1+✏ if φ ≤ φm
∞ if φ > φm
(1)
have to be incurred. All firms have access to this technology and if ✏ > 0, marginal
and average R&D costs increase in φ. If more than one firm does R&D, it is assumed
that firm i obtains the innovation with arrival rate βiφ if its share in total R&D costs
is given by βi. By increasing its own R&D effort, a firm therefore increases the R&D
costs of all other firms (ceteris paribus). A reason for this might be that the supply
curve for R&D inputs (like researchers) is upward sloping so that their price increases
if demand for them increases. But even if R&D inputs are supplied elastically, it might
be impossible to perfectly coordinate all R&D activities, meaning that the probability
14The feature that incremental profits decrease in the size of the lead arises in many contexts and
more general settings and is the source of the ”Arrow replacement effect” (Arrow (1962)) and the
”escape competition effect” (Aghion et al. (2001)), which are widely discussed in the literature.
15It is not possible to skip a step in the ladder, as inventing the newest generation k+1 of the good
requires access to the technology of generation k (or to the technologies of all previous generations
i ≤ k). An invention might, however, simply consist of adding a new component to an otherwise
unchanged product (e.g. a new generation of software might simply consist of the previous generation
with some added features).
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of duplicative research increases in the total number of R&D inputs that are used.16
While it is assumed here that a firm can only increase rivals R&D costs by undertaking
R&D itself, the case where this is possible by simply buying/hiring R&D inputs and
then using them for other purposes than R&D is analyzed in Section 8.1.2.17 In order
to simplify the analysis, it is assumed that the arrival rate cannot surpass the level
φm for technological reasons.
3.2 Equilibrium
In the following, the stationary Markov perfect equilibrium is derived in which firms’
strategies only depend on payoff-relevant variables.18 In order to avoid a situation in
which no firm ever finds it profitable to undertake R&D, it is assumed that c < ⇡1
r
(Assumption 2). Given an innovation has the value VE for a newly entering firm
19,
entry occurs until the average cost of innovating is equal to this value, i.e. until the
following free entry condition is satisfied20:
VE ≤ c(φ∗)✏ (2)
This condition pins down a lower bound for the equilibrium rate of innovation21
φ∗ as an increasing function of VE. But the fact that this condition depends on the
value of an innovation for an entrant does not imply that R&D is actually carried out
16In the case where N firms come up with the same innovation at the same instant of time, each
would then obtain IP protection with probability 1
N
. In this case, the R&D effort exerted by one
firm does not directly affect the price of inputs for other firms but increases their expected R&D
costs per obtained IPR (patent) by lowering the probability of actually obtaining IP protection for
the innovation.
17A case where a firm actually has to do R&D in order to increase rivals R&D costs is that where
R&D costs increase due to duplication but not due to an upward sloping supply curve for R&D
inputs. But also if R&D workers enjoy doing R&D and have to be paid more if they are forced to do
other things, the cheapest way for a firm to increase a rivals R&D costs might be to do R&D itself.
18These variables include the size of the lead, profit flows, R&D costs and the rate of interest
but not the generation k of the good, the identity of the market leader, or time. Nonstationary
endogenous cycle equilibria that can occur in quality-ladder models are therefore not considered.
19This value is independent of whether an entrant replaces an incumbent with a one- or a two step
lead, as (gross) profits in both cases are given by ⇡1.
20An entering firm that contributes to an overall increase in R&D effort does not take the fact that
it increases the R&D costs of all other firms into account, and it therefore still finds entry profitable
if the average costs are lower than VE , even if the marginal costs are higher. As total R&D costs are
given by C(φ) = cφ1+✏, average costs are given by a(φ) = cφ✏.
The qualitative results would, however, be the same if entry only occurred up to the point where
VE is equal to the marginal R&D costs m(φ) = (1 + ✏)cφ
✏.
21Equilibrium values are starred.
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by entrants in equilibrium. Take the case of an incumbent firm with a two step lead.
Without any threat of entry, this firm does not do any R&D, as it cannot increase
profits above the current level ⇡2. If there is free entry, however, the incumbent knows
that if she does not do any R&D, the instantaneous probability of replacement is given
by the free entry condition as φ∗ =
(
VE
c
) 1
✏ . Assuming that incumbents move first (are
Stackelberg leaders) and that entrants can adjust their R&D spending after observing
the level of R&D the incumbent undertakes, this probability is independent of whether
the incumbent does part of the R&D herself. This is because the average R&D costs
that determine the profitability of entry only depend on total R&D spending, so
that one unit of R&D undertaken by the incumbent crowds out one unit undertaken
by entrants.22 The incumbent can therefore reduce the instantaneous probability of
replacement from φ∗ to (1 − β)φ∗ if she bears the costs βc(φ∗)1+✏. As successfully
innovating entrants have to compete with the previous incumbents and only get (gross)
profits ⇡1 upon entry (and maybe later on ⇡2 if they do a follow-on innovation), the
value of an innovation VE for an entrant is lower than an incumbents willingness to
pay for keeping her two step lead. Because of this ”efficiency effect” (which was first
analyzed by Gilbert and Newbery (1982)), the incumbent finds it profitable to increase
her R&D effort as long as β < 1, as the marginal value of reducing the probability
of losing the two step lead exceeds the marginal costs, which in this case are equal to
the average costs c(φ∗)✏ and also equal to the value of an innovation for an entrant
(VE) due to the free entry condition.
23 Therefore, an incumbent with a two step lead
finds it profitable to preempts entry by doing exactly as much R&D as needed to push
average R&D costs up to (or slightly above) the value of an innovation for an entrant.
In the case where the incumbent only has a one step lead she also does all the R&D
in equilibrium, as she values obtaining the next innovation (which guarantees a two
step lead) more than an entering firm does (which can only get a one step lead). We
can therefore state:24
22Given the assumed R&D cost function, the free entry condition is the same, independent of the
number of potential entrants. The analysis would therefore be the same even if there was only one
single potential entrant.
23The value of incumbency is given by VI =
⇡2−βc(φ
∗)1+✏
r+(1−β)φ∗ . Inserting φ
∗ =
(
VE
c
) 1
✏ and deriving with
respect to β, we obtain that sign@VI
@β
> 0 if VE
⇣(
VE
c
)✏
+ r
⌘
< ⇡2. This condition is satisfied given
that VE < VI =
⇡2−βc
⇣
VE
c
⌘ 1+✏
✏
r+(1−β)
⇣
VE
c
⌘ 1
✏
.
24The equilibrium analyzed here can either be seen as one where the incumbent is a Stackelberg
leader in the R&D game or as a Walrasian equilibrium where the total demand for R&D inputs is
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Lemma 1 Given the incumbent moves first in the R&D game, she undertakes all
R&D in equilibrium so that there is persistent leadership
Once the incumbent has reached a two step lead, the rate of innovation depends
(through the free entry condition) positively on VE, the value of an innovation for an
entrant. To solve for the equilibrium, we therefore need to determine VE given that
an entering firm expects to expand its lead to two steps in the future and then to
remain the leader, doing only as much R&D as needed to preempt entry. Denoting
the value of being two (one) steps ahead by V2 (V1) and the R&D effort undertaken
by an incumbent with a two step (one step) lead by φ2 (φ1), the following arbitrage
conditions must be satisfied:
rV2 = ⇡2 − cφ1+✏2 and
rV1 = ⇡1 − cφ1+✏1 − φ1V1 + φ1V2.
The right hand side in the first equation indicates the per period profits derived
from selling the good minus the costs of conducting the level of R&D φ2 that is needed
to preempt entry. There are two additional terms in the second equation because the
incumbent gains a two step lead and looses her one step lead in the case of an innovation
(which occurs with arrival rate φ1). As the value of an innovation for an entrant is
exactly the value of obtaining a one step lead, we can solve the two equations for VE:
VE = V1 =
⇡1 − cφ1+✏1
r + φ1
+
φ1
r + φ1
⇡2 − cφ1+✏2
r
(3)
The free entry condition therefore becomes:
⇡1 − c(φ∗1)1+✏
r + φ∗1
+
φ∗1
r + φ∗1
⇡2 − c(φ∗2)1+✏
r
= c(φ∗2)
✏ ≤ c(φ∗1)✏ (4)
While this condition is always binding when the incumbent has a two step lead,
it might be the case that an incumbent with a one step lead wants to get a two step
lead more quickly, so that she does more R&D than required to increase average R&D
costs to a level that preempts entry (meaning that φ∗1 > φ
∗
2).
equal to the supply and in which the auctioneer allocates all R&D to the incumbent who is willing to
pay at least as much for it as the entrants. As the entrants get zero profits in equilibrium, they are
indifferent about the amount of R&D that they undertake and, if an incumbent would do less R&D
than the equilibrium level, the Walrasian auctioneer would simply assign a larger amount of R&D to
entrants in order to obtain the equilibrium (see Cozzi (2008) for a more detailed discussion).
A similar equilibrium might also be obtained as the outcome of an auction in which incumbents
and entrants simultaneously bid for R&D inputs.
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In order to simplify the analysis, the case where ✏ → 0 is considered in the following.
In the case where ✏ = 0, the equilibrium amount of R&D the incumbent or entrants
undertake is undetermined if the free entry condition is satisfied with equality (VE =
c).25 However, if ✏ is slightly positive, the preemption equilibrium results and the R&D
rate is well determined for each point in time and equal to that that entrants expect
to choose themselves in the case where they enter and become the next leaders. In
the following, it is therefore assumed that in the case where ✏ = 0, the equilibrium is
selected that results as the limit if ✏ → 0. For ✏ = 0, marginal and average R&D costs
are equal to c, and the free entry condition is given by:
VE =
⇡1 − cφ∗1
r + φ∗1
+
φ∗1
r + φ∗1
⇡2 − cφ∗2
r
= c (5)
We can now analyze how the equilibrium rate of innovation φ∗2 depends on the
different parameters of the model.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium innovation rate φ∗2 increases in ⇡1 and ⇡2 and de-
creases in r and c. An incumbent with a one step lead sets φ∗1 = φ
∗
2
Proof. See Appendix A
The intuition for these results is straightforward: once the incumbent has reached
a two step lead, she does just as much R&D as needed to preempt entry. And this
preemptive R&D level depends positively on entry pressure, i.e. on the incentives of
entrants to undertake R&D in order to enter and to become the next incumbent. Entry
pressure decreases in the R&D costs c and increases in the value of an innovation for
an entrant which depends positively on profit flows ⇡1 and ⇡2 and negatively on the
rate of interest r due to a discounting effect.
In the following sections, the effects that different IP policies have on the rate of
innovation are analyzed.26
25While the value of an innovation for an entrant (VE) depends on the amount of R&D φ
∗
2 that
entrants expect to do in the future to preempt entry, it is independent of the level of current R&D.
26The analysis here focuses on the effects on the innovation rate without analyzing welfare impli-
cations. In the model setup described in footnote 13, however, it is easy to show that maximizing
the innovation rate also maximizes welfare under Assumption 2 in the case where ✏ → 0 and where
the rate of interest is equal to the rate of time preference.
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4 Collusion and ”extended lagging breadth”
If entrants are allowed to collude with previous incumbents in the product market or
if one of the firms is allowed to sells its IPR (or an exclusive license) to the other,
this permits them to avoid the phase of competition and to increase profits from ⇡1
to ⇡2. Given incumbents cannot commit to compete and are willing to collude once
entry occurs, this increases the value of an innovation for entrants and therefore entry
pressure and the rate of innovation and the more so, the larger the bargaining power
of entrants is.27
In the case of collusion, the efficiency effect disappears, as entry no longer reduces
joint profits. The incumbent now values not being replaced equally much as the
entrants value entering, as she still gets a share of the surplus in case of entry. The
incumbent is thus indifferent about her share in total R&D and there need not be
persistent leadership anymore. The equilibrium rate of innovation that is determined
by the free entry condition is, however, independent of whether the incumbent or the
entrants carry out R&D.
From Proposition 1 we know that the equilibrium innovation rate φ∗2 is maximal if
entrants obtain the maximal market power (which has the value V2) immediately upon
entry, i.e. if ⇡1 = ⇡2. Collusion can, however, only lead to this outcome if entrants
have all the bargaining power.28 If entrants are weak bargainers, another possible
way to increase innovation is to take all bargaining power away from incumbents by
preventing them from competing in the product market once entry of a firm with an
improved version of the good has occurred.29 This can, for example, be achieved by
27Taking future entry pressure and the preemptive R&D level φ∗2 as given, the value V2 =
⇡2−cφ
∗
2
r
can be shared among the parties. Once entry has occurred and R&D costs are sunk, the entrant has
to get at least the value VE =
⇡1−cφ1
r+φ1
+ φ1
r+φ1
⇡2−cφ
∗
2
r
which he gets if there is no collusion (the outside
option of the incumbent is zero). Suppose the entrant gets the fraction #V2 ≥ VE of the ”profit pie”
with # denoting his bargaining power. Then, the free entry condition is given by #
⇡2−cφ
∗
2
r
= c, so that
the equilibrium rate of innovation φ∗2 increases in # and is larger than in the case without collusion
if #V2 > VE .
The result that allowing collusion does not increase the innovation rate if entrants do not have any
bargaining power does not hold in the leapfrogging case where equilibrium profits are always given
by ⇡1 if there is no collusion. In this case, the value of an innovation and the innovation rate always
increase under collusion as joint profits are increased and as entrants anticipate obtaining a larger
share of the pie once the next entrant replaces them (see Segal and Whinston (2007)).
28That means if # = 1, using the notation of footnote 27.
29In the case where there are fixed (operating) costs associated with production, a replaced mo-
nopolist might exit the market completely and not constrain the price setting power of the entrant
at all. In this case, entrants would directly get profit flows ⇡2.
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making the IPR (patent) of the incumbent infringe on that of the entrant. Granting
such ”extended lagging breadth” therefore allows entrants to obtain the maximal30
market power and profit flows ⇡2 immediately upon entry.
31 Then, there can again
be either persistent leadership or leapfrogging (or a mixture of both), as incumbents
and entrants have the same incentives to innovate in this case. The equilibrium rate
of innovation can now be obtained from the free entry condition V2 = c, implying that
φ∗2 =
⇡2
c
− r.
5 Protection against replacement
5.1 Entry fees
As each innovation improves upon the last one, innovators use the knowledge accu-
mulated by previous innovators as an R&D input. Let us now assume that there is a
policy requiring a successful innovator to pay a fixed fee F upon entry into the product
market in order to compensate previous innovators. Even in the case where the entire
fee has to be given to the previous incumbent, there is still persistent leadership and
preemption. The reason for this is that the incumbent firm values not being replaced
more than the entrant values entering, so that there is no value of F for which, at the
same time, the entrant is willing to undertake R&D in order to enter, and the incum-
bent is willing to permit entry by not doing any preemptive R&D. If entry nevertheless
occurs (out of equilibrium), entrants therefore expect to become the next leaders and
to do all the follow-on R&D themselves and to never receive any licensing fees from
others. The value of an innovation for an entrant is therefore given by:
30In the case where a lead of more than two steps is required in order to become the unconstrained
monopolist, the entrant’s market power can be increased (up to the maximum) if not only the IPR of
the second-newest generation of the good infringes on the IPR of the entrant, but also on the IPRs
of the third, fourth... newest goods.
31In the case where instead of using IPRs firms can also protect their innovations through trade
secrecy, the problem arises that if one firm opts for trade secrecy, the following will do so as well for
this reason: as an entrant who obtains IPR protection in this case cannot block the production of
the previous generation of the good, profits upon entry are given by ⇡1 in both cases, while the risk
of being replaced in the future is lower in the case of trade secrecy where the following entrant does
not obtain the full market power immediately. However, starting from a situation in which all firms
use IPRs and in which there is extended lagging breadth, entrants do not prefer using trade secrecy
as, under free entry, the value of an innovation is in each case equal to c (under extended lagging
breadth, profits upon entry are higher but the expected rate of replacement (entry pressure) is also
higher so that VE is the same as in the case of trade secrecy, where profits are initially lower but
where future entry pressure is lower as well).
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VE =
⇡1 − cφ1
r + φ1
+
φ1
r + φ1
⇡2 − cφ2
r
− F (6)
The free entry condition is now
⇡1−cφ∗1
r+φ∗1
+
φ∗1
r+φ∗1
⇡2−cφ∗2
r
= c+F (where either φ∗1 = φ
∗
2
or φ∗1 = φm) and an increase in F unambiguously reduces the equilibrium innovation
rate φ∗2. The intuition for this is simply that any kind of licensing fee or other fixed
fee (like IP litigation costs) that has to be paid upon entry in the product market
decreases the value of an innovation for an entrant and therefore entry pressure and
the incumbents R&D effort required to preempt entry.32
If it is possible to subsidize entry (impose a negative F ), this increases the rate of
R&D φ∗2 although the subsidy never has to be paid in equilibrium (given it is not too
large).33
5.2 Forward protection
It is now assumed that an entrants IPR (generation k + 1) infringes on the IPR of
the previous generation (k) of the good (but not on generation k − 1), so that the
incumbent has blocking power over the innovation of the next entrant. O’Donoghue
and Zweimu¨ller (2004) call such an arrangement ”forward protection” and assume
that entrants and incumbents are only allowed to collude in prices if there is forward
protection. As in the previous sections, allowing collusion was innovation-enhancing,
while increasing the incumbent’s blocking or bargaining power decreased the rate of
innovation, it is not a priori clear whether forward protection, which includes both
elements, increases or decreases the rate of innovation (when compared to a case with-
out forward protection and without collusion). Again, it is assumed that incumbents
32While the effect of an increase in F on φ∗2 is unambiguously negative, increasing F can, however,
induce an incumbent with a one step-lead to race faster. In the working paper version of this article
(in Section 12 ), the more general case in which IP protection regularly expires is considered and it is
shown that φ∗1 = φm holds in equilibrium if F is sufficiently large. While increasing F still decreases
the average innovation rate in most cases, there is a parameter range in which a slight increase in F
actually increases the average innovation rate if it induces firms with a one step lead to set φ∗1 = φm
instead of φ∗1 = φ
∗
2 < φm.
Even if only entrants are capable of doing R&D so that there is leapfrogging, imposing licensing fees
reduces innovation incentives and the rate of innovation by leading to more backloaded profit flows.
A similar reasoning applies in a product variety setting, where (for a given level of appropriability
in the final goods markets) incentives for continuous innovation are larger if IPRs do not grant
blocking power over future innovations and if there is no need for licensing (see also Llanes and
Trento (forthcoming)).
33Such a policy would be especially effective in the case where the R&D productivity of entrants
is lower (c is larger) than that of incumbents.
16
cannot commit not to collude ex post.
Proposition 2 Forward protection reduces the equilibrium innovation rate (φ∗2). An
equilibrium under forward protection exists if φm >
⇡2
c
− r2
φm
− 2r > 0. There is
persistent leadership and an incumbent with a one step lead does the maximal amount
of R&D in equilibrium (φ∗1 = φm).
Proof. See Appendix B
This is the first main result of the article. As incumbents can prevent entrants
from producing the next generation of the good, entry does not reduce their profits
and there is no need to collude with entrants and to give them a share of the pie.34
Forward protection therefore deters entry by decreasing ⇡1 to zero and unambiguously
reduces the equilibrium innovation rate.35 This result differs from the ones obtained
in models where there is leapfrogging, like O’Donoghue and Zweimu¨ller (2004) and
O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse (1998). In these models, firms never lead by
more than one step so that (gross) profit flows are given by ⇡1 in the standard case.
Introducing forward protection then allows firms to collude and to increase joint profit
flows to ⇡2. If the incumbents’ bargaining power is not too large, so that entrants get
a large enough share of the increased profit pie immediately upon entry (i.e. if profit
flows are not too backloaded), forward protection can therefore increase the value of
an innovation and the equilibrium innovation rate.36
34This is different in the more general model which is discussed in Appendix 2, Section 12, where
the entrant’s innovation allows an increase in joint profits above the level that the incumbent can
obtain alone. But while incumbents want to collude with entrants in order to increase profits in
this case, entrants never obtain a share of profits that is larger than in the case without forward
protection, so that forward protection again decreases growth.
35This result, however, changes if forward protection allows incumbents and entrants to coordinate
their joint R&D spending. In this case, they can increase joint profits by reducing the amount of
R&D the entrant undertakes from φ∗1 = φm to φ1 = φ
∗
2. Forward protection then reduces the rate of
innovation if the bargaining power of entrants is weak and increases it if entrants are strong bargainers
and if φm is large (see the working paper version of this article, Section 13 ).
36It should be noted that simply permitting collusion in both the case of persistent leadership and of
leapfrogging without granting forward protection unambiguously increases the value of an innovation
for an entrant and the equilibrium innovation rate. The reason for this is that by granting blocking
power to incumbents, forward protection greatly discourages entry by increasing the incumbents’
bargaining power. Again, introducing extended lagging breadth, which makes private negotiations
unnecessary and gives all the market power to entrants immediately upon entry, leads to even larger
innovation incentives in both cases.
17
5.3 Forward protection of finite duration
It was assumed in the previous section that forward protection is granted for an in-
finite duration. If this is not the case and if courts can become more lax over time
in protecting IPR holders against follow-on innovators, the results can change sub-
stantially. It is now assumed that forward protection allows incumbents who have IP
protection on generation k of the good to block entry of any improved version k + i
(with i ≥ 1, so that not only entry of generation k+1 can be blocked as in the previous
section37), but that this blocking power expires with hazard rate ⌘. Once the blocking
power expires, entrants with an improved version no longer infringe on the the in-
cumbents IPR, while the IPR still prohibits copying the incumbents good (generation
k). In order to introduce the mechanism in the clearest way, it is initially assumed
that extended lagging breadth is granted in the case where the incumbents blocking
power has expired, so that a successful innovator directly gets the maximal profit flows
⇡2 upon entry into the product market. Contrary to the previous sections, forward
protection therefore only serves as a device for blocking entry and does not facilitate
collusion. If forward protection on generation k of the good has expired and the next
generation k + 1 is invented, the new inventor is again granted forward protection,
with the instantaneous probability of expiration again given by ⌘. There are therefore
two states in which the economy can be: state F , where the holder of the IPR on
the newest generation of the good can block any entry due to forward protection, and
state N , where forward protection has expired and in which there is free entry into
R&D. The value of the IPR covering the newest generation of the good is denoted by
VF in state F and by VN in state N . In state N , the free entry condition
38 VF = c pins
down the innovation rate φN , while no R&D takes place in state F , so that φF = 0.
39
As extended lagging breadth makes incumbents indifferent with respect to their share
in total R&D in state N , VF is the same as in the case where there is leapfrogging,
and can therefore be derived from the arbitrage conditions rVN = ⇡2 − φNVN and
rVF = ⇡2 − ⌘VF + ⌘VN , so that VF = ⇡2r+⌘ + ⌘r+⌘ ⇡2r+φN . The free entry condition VF = c
can then be solved for the innovation rate in state N :
37Instead, it could be assumed that prohibitively high entry fees are imposed on all follow-on
innovators.
38While R&D only takes place in state N , the value of an innovation for an entrant is given by VF ,
as there is a switch to state F if an innovation occurs.
39Given that ✏ → 0, no entrant has incentives to do R&D in the phase of forward protection, as
profits can only be made once forward protection has expired, so that the value of an innovation is
given by eVF = ⌘r+⌘VF < VF = c.
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φ∗N =
⌘⇡2
c (r + ⌘)− ⇡2 − r (7)
φ∗N is positive if ⌘ >
⇡2
c
− r > 0 and decreases in ⌘ as the value of an innovation VF
declines if forward protection expires faster due to an increase in ⌘. While reducing ⌘
increases φ∗N , however, it also increases the likelihood that the economy is in state F
in which there is no innovation, so that it is interesting to analyze the effect of ⌘ on
the average rate of innovation bφ.
Proposition 3 Assuming that there is extended lagging breadth when forward protec-
tion has expired (in state N) and that ⌘ > ⇡2
c
− r > 0, the average innovation rate is
given by bφ = ⌘φ∗N
⌘+φ∗
N
(with φ∗N taken from equation (7)) and is maximal for the interior
expiration rate ⌘∗ = ⇡2
c
− r +
√
⇡2(⇡2−rc)
c
.
Proof. See Appendix C
The average innovation rate bφ can therefore be increased beyond the level φ2 =
⇡2
c
−r that can be obtained with extended lagging breadth without forward protection
(that means if ⌘ → ∞) if successful innovators are granted blocking power over future
innovations for a limited time span. The reason for this is that granting such forward
protection increases the effective length of IP protection by reducing the probability
of replacement by a follow-on innovator, and therefore encourages innovation in state
N . If forward protection is granted for an infinite duration (⌘ = 0), the average
innovation rate is, however, zero as follow-on R&D can then be blocked forever (so
that the economy is never in state N). Replacing ⇡2 with ⇡1, this result clearly also
applies to a standard leapfrogging setting without extended lagging breadth.40
In the following, the assumption of extended lagging breadth in state N is relaxed.
In the cases where in state N entry leads to a phase of competition with reduced profits
⇡1, or in which profit flows for successful innovators are more backloaded because
entrants have to compensate previous incumbents to some extent, the value of an
40An important assumption in this section is that expiration of forward protection does not imply
a complete expiration of IP protection. If, however, expiration of forward protection also implies a
complete expiration of IP protection, meaning that competitors are allowed to copy the good so that
profits fall to zero, the results change. In Appendix D it is shown that introducing such IP protection
of limited duration cannot increase the average innovation rate beyond the level that is obtained
with extended lagging breadth and infinitely lived IP protection if there is no forward protection.
The reason for this is that making IP protection expire pushes profits in state N to zero, and this
discourages innovation more than the introduction of forward protection of limited duration increases
it.
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innovation VF for an entrant is reduced for any value of ⌘, so that φ
∗
N , the rate
of innovation in state N , declines. This unambiguously reduces the average rate of
innovation bφ, implying that , extended lagging breadth for any given expiration rate
⌘ maximizes bφ. In the case where entrants first get profit flows ⇡1, and only in the
case of two successive innovations profit flows ⇡2, there is again persistent leadership,
and in order to prevent being replaced, incumbents with a two step lead undertake the
preemptive amount of R&D φ∗2N if the economy is in state N . Let us now assume that
the probability of expiration ⌘i can be made conditional on the number i of consecutive
innovations that an innovator has attained. Then, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 4 Given the incumbent has undertaken i ≥ K consecutive innovations.
Then, starting from a situation with uniform expiration rates ⌘i = ⌘ > 0, the average
rate of innovation bφ can be increased by marginally reducing expiration rates ⌘i for
firms with i < K consecutive innovations.
Proof. See Appendix E
If the expiration rates ⌘i are only marginally reduced for entrants or firms who
have recently entered, this increases the value of an innovation for an entrant, but
not enough to offset the efficiency effect, so that the incumbent still finds preempting
entry worthwhile. Due to increased entry pressure, the preemptive amount of R&D
φ∗2N that the incumbent undertakes in state N increases so that the average innovation
rate bφ = ⌘φ∗N
⌘+φ∗
N
increases if the rate ⌘, with which forward protection for the incumbent
expires, is unchanged.
6 Minimal inventive step
So far it has been assumed that firms cannot influence the size of the quality improve-
ment that an innovation brings, and that incremental profits as a function of the lead
are therefore exogenously given. Moreover, the case has been considered in which a
two step lead ensures that the quality difference between the leaders product and that
of the closest follower is so large that the leader can set the unconstrained monopoly
price and can obtain the maximal possible profits. This section looks at the case where
R&D firms are capable of targeting different innovation sizes µ at different costs. It is
assumed that there is still an upper bound ⇡ on profits for firms whose lead in terms
of quality is larger than a certain threshold. However, it is now possible to reach this
lead by either undertaking many little steps (small µ) or a few large steps (large µ).
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As the step size measures the quality difference between the new and the previous
generation of the good, marginal profits increase in µ, so that for example profits in
the case of a one step lead are given by ⇡1(µ1) with
@⇡1(µ1)
@µ1
> 0 if the first step is of
size µ1.
In this setting, there is an additional instrument that IP policy can use: a non-
obviousness requirement that sets a lower bound on the inventive step below which an
inventor cannot obtain IP protection. Let us assume that R&D costs Ci(φi, µi) for a
firm i that targets inventive step (innovation size) µi and wants to obtain the arrival
rate φi is given by Ci(φi, µi) = cφiλ(µi)(Ctot)
✏ with @λ(µi)
@µi
> 0 and Ctot = Ci + C−i
indicating the overall (industry-wide) R&D spending. For a given amount of R&D
spending Ci, targeting a larger inventive step µi therefore implies a lower hazard rate
φi. Moreover, it is assumed that it is prohibitively costly to target a drastic innovation
which would give an entrant the maximal lead with profits ⇡ in a single step. Given
that ✏ > 0, R&D costs for firm i increase in total R&D spending.41 Due to this
assumption, an incumbent may again preempt entry by undertaking a large enough
amount of R&D in order to increase the entrants’ R&D costs.
Expected profits of an entrant who targets the step size µ1 and innovation rate φ in
order to obtain a one step lead can be written as EΠE = φVE − cφλ(µ1)(Ctot)✏, where
VE denotes the value of obtaining a one step lead. VE is a function of µ1 and of the
whole path of inventive steps and innovation rates that the entrant expects to choose in
order to advance his lead and to preempt entry in the future. The free entry condition
that must be satisfied in equilibrium is given by VE = cλ(µ1)(Ctot)
✏ and pins down the
total R&D spending Ctot as a positive function of VE. As the incumbent pays the same
prices for R&D inputs as entrants and values not being replaced more than entrants
value entry42, she again finds it profitable to do all the R&D in equilibrium and to
preempt entry. The crucial assumption due to which preemption is always feasible
and profitable is therefore that only the incumbents total R&D spending matters for
the entrants’ R&D costs, but not the combination of step size and innovation rate
that the incumbent chooses. An incumbent whose lead is large enough to allow her
to charge the maximal price ⇡ therefore does not care about the inventive step of her
innovations but only about the total R&D spending which is needed to make entry
41A reason for that might be that the price of R&D inputs increases if demand for them increases.
42The value of incumbency VI is larger than the value of entering VE for all sizes of the lead due
to the efficiency effect.
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unprofitable.43 An entrant’s incentives to innovate, however, depend on the sequence
of inventive steps chosen to reach a lead that is large enough to obtain the profit flow
⇡. Without any non-obviousness requirement, entrants chose the sequence and sizes
of inventive steps that maximize the present discounted value of their R&D activity.
Therefore, any binding requirement that restricts the R&D decisions of entrants and
of incumbents who have less than the maximal lead necessarily decreases the value
VE that entrants derive from undertaking R&D, and therefore reduces entry pressure.
And if entry pressure is reduced, an incumbent with the maximal lead who does all
R&D in equilibrium needs to spend less on R&D in order to discourage entry. However,
imposing a non-obviousness requirement solely on incumbents with the maximal lead
has no effect on their overall R&D spending and can moreover prevent them from
targeting inefficiently small inventive steps.44 We therefore obtain the second main
result of the article:
Proposition 5 Imposing a non-obviousness requirement that is binding for entrants
and/or incumbents who have not reached the maximal lead reduces equilibrium R&D
spending. Inefficiently small inventive steps can be avoided by imposing a non-obviousness
requirement only on incumbents who have obtained the maximal lead. Such a policy
does not affect equilibrium R&D spending.
This result differs from the previous literature. O’Donoghue and Zweimu¨ller (2004)
and Hunt (2004) show that, in the case of leapfrogging, imposing a patentability (non-
obviousness) requirement can increase the rate of innovation and welfare. O’Donoghue
(1998) reaches the same conclusion in a model where even incumbent firms do some
R&D in equilibrium, but in which preemption is not possible, so that there is no per-
sistent leadership. The following mechanisms are at work in these articles: imposing
a patentability requirement makes innovating harder and prolongs incumbency by re-
ducing the frequency of innovation and therefore the risk of being replaced. This again
43This can be different if the incumbents R&D activity affects the entrants’ R&D profitability by
increasing the risk of duplication. If in this case, incumbents are forced to pursue considerably larger
inventive steps than entrants, this makes it more costly for them to target a certain innovation rate
and duplication risk, so that they might no longer find it profitable to preempt entry. Weinschenk
(2009) studies a two-period model with two firms and finds that preempting entry is only profitable
for the incumbent if innovation is associated with a high success probability.
44In the simple model analyzed here, incumbents are indifferent with respect to the inventive step
chosen so that they might not select the socially optimal step size if there is no non-obviousness
requirement. In a more general model where incumbents can increase their profit flows through
R&D, Denicolo` (2001) shows that incumbents tend to pursue inventive steps that are too small, so
that a non-obviousness requirement is more likely to impose a binding restriction.
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increases the value of an innovation and the incentives to do R&D. Moreover, as firms
are constrained by competition from the previous generation of the good, markups
and therefore profit flows are increased if firms pursue larger quality improvements.
Finally, imposing a patentability requirement can prevent firms from pursuing ineffi-
ciently small inventive steps. Contrary to that, incumbents already enjoy the maximal
market power in the case of persistent leadership and need to be pushed in order to
innovate more. Relaxing the non-obviousness requirement for entrants but not for
incumbents therefore increases entry pressure and the equilibrium innovation rate. As
entrants do not innovate in equilibrium, inefficiently small inventive steps are, however,
never realized, although entrants could obtain IP protection on them.
Given the policy maker (the patent office) can observe whether an innovation
passes a certain inventive step45, it might still be impossible to impose different non-
obviousness requirements on incumbents depending on whether they have reached the
maximal lead (are unconstrained monopolists). However, making the non-obviousness
requirement conditional on whether an entrant or an incumbent realizes an innovation
only requires that the policy maker (patent office) can observe whether the firm filing
for IP protection already has IP protection for the previous generation of the good.
By not imposing a non-obviousness requirement on entrants, entry pressure and the
rate of innovation could therefore be increased.46
7 State-dependent intellectual property protection
This section analyzes the effects of IP expiration in the basic model in which IPRs
protect against imitation, but in which there is no forward protection and in which the
45Hopenhayn, Llobet and Mitchell (2006) study the optimal patent system in a quality-ladder
model where the patent office cannot observe the size of the inventive step and therefore cannot
impose a patentability requirement. Under the assumption all innovations are realized by entrants,
they find that the optimal R&D incentives can be obtained through a patent buyout scheme. This
requires that an inventor pays a certain fee to the previous patent holder in order to be allowed to
replace her, and that the size of the fee depends on the level of protection that the previous inventor
has ”bought” from the patent office. Such a scheme, however, is likely to reduce innovation in a
setting where incumbents innovate preemptively, as it allows the incumbent to preempt entry by
simply buying protection against replacement, instead of doing R&D.
46If incumbents do not have perfect information about the entrants’ R&D costs or the extent of
decreasing returns to R&D, it might be optimal for them to target a level of R&D which allows for
entry with a positive probability. In order to avoid inefficiently small innovations from being targeted
and carried out by entrants, imposing a non-obviousness requirement also on entrants might be useful
in this case. However, as long as entrants do not do much R&D in equilibrium, the non-obviousness
requirement for them should still be weaker than that imposed on incumbents in order to keep entry
pressure high.
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step size is constant and exogenous. Like Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012), the general
case of ”state-dependent intellectual property protection” is analyzed in which the
probability of IP expiration can depend on whether a firm has a one step or a two (or
more) step lead over its rivals.47 The IPRs of a firm with a one step lead are assumed
to expire with the instantaneous Poisson arrival rate γ1 and those of a firm with a
two step lead with the instantaneous arrival rate γ2. In the case of IP expiration, the
newest generation of the good falls in the public domain, allowing competitors to copy
it freely and to fully catch up.48
Assuming that there is no collusion, the value of an innovation for an entrant,
VE, is independent of whether the IPR of the previous generation of the good has
expired and also independent of the size of the previous incumbents lead. In the case
of persistent leadership, VE (that means the value of being one step ahead) and the
value V2 of being two (or more) steps ahead can be derived from the following arbitrage
conditions (again looking at the case where ✏ → 0):
rV2 = ⇡2 − cφ2 − γ2V2
rVE = ⇡1 − cφ1 − γ1VE − φ1VE + φ1V2
from which we get:
VE =
⇡1 − cφ1
r + γ1 + φ1
+
φ1
r + γ1 + φ1
⇡2 − cφ2
r + γ2
(8)
A firm with a one step lead sets its innovation rate φ1 as a function of the IP
expiration rates γ1 and γ2 which determine the relative profitability of a two step lead
compared to a one step lead.
Lemma 2 (i) If γ1 >
⇡1
c
− r and if γ2 < ⇡22c − r, a firm with a one step lead selects
R&D effort φ∗1 = φm given that φm is sufficiently large.
(ii) If γ1 ≤ ⇡1c − r and if γ2 ≤ γ1 + ⇡2−⇡1c , a firm with a one step lead selects the
preemptive R&D level φ∗1 = φ
∗
2 < φm
(iii) If γ1 ≤ ⇡1c − r and if γ2 > γ1 + ⇡2−⇡1c , a firm with a one step lead does not do any
R&D (φ∗1 = 0), so that there is leapfrogging.
47Conditioning intellectual property policy (or antitrust policy that has similar effects) on the size
of a firm’s lead is only possible if the policy maker (e.g. the patent office or the regulator) has detailed
information about market conditions and can observe this lead. This might therefore be considerably
harder than to just condition IPR policy on whether an innovation is undertaken by an entrant or
an incumbent.
48This specification implicitly assumes that IP protection on second-newest goods never expires.
The case in which firms with a two step lead can lose this lead for a one step lead (because their IPR
on the second-newest good expires) is not considered.
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Proof. see Appendix F
Due to Assumption 1 (⇡2 ≤ 2⇡1), the conditions in Regime (i) imply that γ1 > γ2
needs to hold, meaning that IP protection needs to expire sufficiently more quickly in
the case of a one step lead than in the case of a two step lead in this regime. This
makes a two step lead relatively more profitable, so that firms with a one step lead
do the maximal amount of R&D φm in order to reach a two step lead as quickly as
possible. In Regime (ii), firms with a one step lead value not being replaced and
reaching a two step lead more than entrants value entry, but they do not want to do
more R&D than necessary to preempt entry so that φ∗1 = φ
∗
2. In Regime (iii), IPRs
expire so much faster in the case of a two step lead than in the case of a one step lead
that firms with a one step lead do not find reaching a two step lead worthwhile and
stop innovating. In Regimes (i) and (ii), the innovation rate in the case where the IPR
on the currently newest generation of the good has expired (”zero step lead”) is given
by φ∗0 = φ
∗
2. While entrants might undertake R&D in this case, the innovation rate is
the same as the preemptive level φ∗2 that incumbents select in order to prevent entry,
as it is pinned down by the same free entry condition VE = c. In Regime (ii), the
innovation rate is therefore independent of the state in which the economy is, while it
is higher in the case of a one step lead than in the case of a zero or a two step lead in
Regime (i). In Regime (iii), entrants undertake all R&D, and the innovation rate φ∗
is independent of the state of the economy as it, again, does not depend on whether
IP protection on the currently newest generation of the good has expired or not. We
can now analyze the effect of IP expiration on the average innovation (arrival) rate bφ
and derive the third main result of the article.
Proposition 6 Given a change in γi does not lead to a switch between regimes, the
average innovation rate bφ decreases in γ1 in all Regimes and decreases in γ2 in Regimes
(i) and (ii). If a marginal shift in parameters leads to a switch from Regime (ii) to
Regime (i), there is a discontinuous increase in bφ, while there is no discontinuity in
the case of a switch between Regimes (ii) and (iii). The (average) innovation rate bφ
is maximal if γ1 = γ2 = 0, that means under full uniform IP protection.
Proof. See Appendix G
Reducing IP protection by increasing γi decreases the value of an innovation for
an entrant and entry pressure in all regimes. This directly leads to a reduction in the
equilibrium rate of innovation in Regimes (iii) and (ii), and also to a decrease in the
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innovation rates φ∗2 = φ
∗
0 in the cases of a two and a zero step lead in Regime (i). In
Regime (i), there is, however, also a ”composition effect” which goes in the opposite
direction: increasing γ2 can now increase the probability that the economy is in the
state in which there is a one step lead and in which the innovation rate is maximal.49
However, this composition effect is not strong enough to overcompensate the negative
effect that an increase in γ2 has on φ
∗
2 = φ
∗
0, so that an increase in γ2 still leads to
a reduction in the average arrival rate bφ.50 The average innovation rate in Regime
(i) is therefore maximal if γ2 = 0, in which case the composition effect disappears
as leaders never loose a two step lead. But given that γ2 = 0, the (equilibrium)
innovation rate bφ = φ∗2 decreases in γ1, as increasing the rate with which IP protection
for firms with a one step lead expires merely reduces the value of an innovation for
an entrant and therefore the amount of R&D the incumbent needs to undertake in
order to preempt entry. Consequently, the (average) innovation rate is maximal under
full uniform IP protection and, unlike in Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012), cannot be
increased by reducing IP protection in a state-dependent way (i.e. by increasing γ1
more than γ2). However, given that γ1 and γ2 are already positive and at a certain
threshold value, a small increase in γ1 can lead to an increase in the average innovation
rate bφ by inducing a switch from Regime (ii) to Regime (i). The reason for this is
that such a decrease in IP protection for firms with a one step lead can induce them
to switch their strategy from only undertaking the amount of R&D that is necessary
to preempt entry to undertaking the maximal amount of R&D in order to reach a two
step lead as quickly as possible. There is therefore a nonlinear relation between γ1 and
the average innovation rate so that the ”incentive effect” identified by Acemoglu and
Akcigit (2012) is at work at a specific threshold value of γ1.
8 Extensions
8.1 Potential perils of strong protection against imitation
In the previous section, it was shown that under free entry, reducing the strength with
which intellectual property rights protect against imitation (that means increasing
γi) cannot increase the average innovation rate through a composition effect, i.e. by
49Increasing γ1 always decreases this probability (see Appendix G).
50In a more general model where ✏ > 0 and where there is no upper bound φm on the innovation
rate, firms with a one step lead would moreover reduce their R&D effort φ∗1 if obtaining a two step
lead becomes less profitable (due to an increase in γ2), so that the composition effect would be even
weaker.
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making a state in which R&D incentives are higher more likely. In the following sub-
sections, cases are analyzed in which this is different and where reducing IP protection
can increase the average innovation rate through such a composition effect (again, it
is assumed that there is no forward protection and that the step size is constant and
exogenous).
8.1.1 Trade secrecy
So far it has been assumed that there is free access to the R&D sector and that
entrants have complete knowledge about the currently newest technology and can
directly start doing frontier R&D. While, ideally, a firm is only granted IP (patent)
protection when it discloses the functioning of its innovation, firms often succeed in
keeping part of their knowledge secret so that competing firms first have to engage in
some duplicative catch-up R&D before they can start conducting frontier R&D. In the
following, it is therefore assumed that entrants first have to spend the fixed catch-up
costs R before they can undertake frontier R&D. It is assumed that the incumbent can
observe an entrant’s catch-up and thus can adjust her R&D spending after observing
entry into the R&D sector. IP protection expires with the constant hazard rate γ and,
in the case of expiration, the newest available quality of the good falls in the public
domain and is supplied at the marginal cost of zero.51 In this case, the incumbent
loses all profits, and it is assumed for simplicity that all knowledge about the currently
newest version of the good falls in the public domain.52
The equilibrium can be derived through backward induction. Given the incumbent
has a lead of one or two steps, and entry into the R&D sector has occurred, the
analysis is the same as in the previous sections, and the incumbent does enough R&D
to completely discourage R&D by the entrant, so that the entrant makes zero profits.
Expecting this, no entrant ever finds it profitable to pay the catch-up costs R, so that
there is no entry into the R&D sector if the currently newest generation of the good
is protected by IPRs. This, however, implies that there is no entry pressure and that
51This specification is chosen for reasons of simplicity, and neglects the case where firms with a two
step lead lose this lead for a one step lead because their IPR on the second-newest good expires. It
is therefore implicitly assumed that IPRs on second-newest goods never expire.
52Alternatively, one could assume that , entrants can merely copy and produce the newest version
of the good in the case of patent expiration, while the previous incumbent still keeps a lead in terms
of knowledge and know-how that is necessary to do frontier R&D. Then, entrants would still need to
pay the catch-up costs R before they can undertake frontier R&D, while previous incumbents could
start right away. This change of assumptions would make the analysis more complicated but would
not change the results qualitatively.
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incumbents do not need to undertake any R&D in order to preempt entry. Incumbents
thus stop innovating after having obtained a two step (or even a one step) lead. If
IPRs have expired and if the currently newest version of the good is in the public
domain, firms might, however, find it profitable to undertake R&D in order to become
the next leader, given that IP protection does not expire too quickly. Denoting the
innovation rate in the case of a one (two) step lead by φ1 (φ2) and that in the case
where IPRs have expired by φ0, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 7 If 0 ≤ γ ≤ ⇡2−⇡1
c
− r (Case A), φ∗0 = φ∗1 = φm and φ∗2 = 0. If
⇡2−⇡1
c
− r < γ ≤ ⇡1
c
− r (Case B), φ∗0 = φm and φ∗1 = φ∗2 = 0 and if γ > ⇡1c − r (Case
C), φ∗0 = φ
∗
1 = φ
∗
2 = 0. The average arrival rate
bφ (”average innovation rate”) is given
by:
bφ =
8><>:
γ3+2γ2φm
(φm+γ)2
in Case A
φmγ
φm+γ
in Case B
0 in Case C
Given that φm(
(
2⇡2−3⇡1
c
)− r)+ (⇡2−⇡1
c
− r)2 > (<)0, bφ is maximal if γ = ⇡2−⇡1
c
− r
(γ = ⇡1
c
− r)
Proof. See Appendix H
There is therefore an inverted-U relation between the average innovation rate and
the strength of IP protection.53 If IPRs are fully protected (the subcase of Case A
where γ = 0), the average innovation rate is zero as there is no entry pressure and as
monopolists rest on their laurels. Reducing the strength of IP protection then increases
the probability of being in the state where no firm has a lead over its rivals and where
innovation incentives are maximal, but also the probability of being in the state where
the incumbent only has a one step lead and might (in Case A) find it profitable to do
R&D in order to obtain a two step lead. If, however, IP protection is too weak (Case
C), the average innovation rate is again zero, as appropriability is so low that firms
do not find it profitable to do R&D, even if the currently newest version of the good
53It should be noted that this result holds for any size of R, as long as incumbents can observe
catch-up and entry and can readjust their R&D effort ex post. However, they might not be capable
of doing that, especially if catch-up costs (R) are low. If incumbents cannot observe catch-up, they
actually have to undertake R&D in order to preempt entry, so that the analysis is again very similar
to that in the previous sections. The fixed catch-up costs then only decrease entry pressure while
stronger IP protection (a lower γ) again encourages innovation. The discontinuity that the effect
of IP protection (γ) on the rate of innovation changes dramatically when even minor fixed costs of
entering the R&D sector are introduced, therefore does not arise if incumbents cannot observe entry.
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is in the public domain.54
8.1.2 Ex ante agreements and different forms of preemption
Proposition 7 holds more generally in any situation where an incumbent does not face
any entry pressure55 and it is in line with the findings of Horowitz and Lai (1996) and
Cadot and Lippman (1995) who assume that only one incumbent firm is capable of
doing R&D. But also in the case where a finite number of firms is capable of doing
R&D and where they can make ex ante agreements about their joint R&D effort and
about how to split profits, the analysis is the same. If these firms maximize joint
profits, they do exactly as much R&D as the incumbent analyzed above. If it is
difficult to prevent ex ante agreements and to force firms to compete in an innovation
race, another possibility for increasing the average innovation rate is therefore to make
IPRs expire with a positive probability.
It was assumed in the analysis above that incumbents can only discourage entrants’
R&D by doing R&D themselves. There might, however, be cases in which incumbents
can increase the R&D costs of potential entrants, or decrease their expected benefits of
innovating, without doing R&D themselves. If there is an upward-sloping supply curve
for R&D labour, incumbents might for example hire a certain amount of R&D labour
in order to increase the wages that rivals need to pay, but employ the researchers
in other areas than R&D. In the case where knowledge is to some extent tacit and
where only researchers who were involved in past R&D are capable of doing frontier
R&D, incumbents can simply offer them long term contracts in order to prevent them
from doing research for entrants.56 While preemption is not costless in these cases,
the result that incumbents stop innovating (or only innovate a little) once they have
obtained a sufficient lead is therefore the same. Because of that, the average innovation
rate is again zero (or very small) if IPRs are fully protected and might increase if IP
54If instead of letting IP protection expire regularly (or reducing the length of IP protection) the
breadth of IP protection was reduced with the effect of reducing the maximal profits to e⇡2 (with
⇡1 < e⇡2 < ⇡2), this would not increase the average innovation rate (see Section 14 of the working
paper version of this article, where also other extensions are discussed).
55Given the constant-return R&D technology with the upper bound φm, the innovation rate φ0 in
the case where the currently newest version of the good is supplied competitively is the same in the
cases where one or several firms are capable of doing R&D.
56If it is costly for researchers to move from the incumbent to an entrant firm, this creates fixed
costs of entering and facilitates preemption. And if incumbents are allowed to forbid their R&D
workers to work for rivals in the future, preemption is even easier.
In the case where the R&D process requires different complementary inputs, it might even be
possible to preempt entry by buying up a sufficient amount of a single R&D input which is in scarce
supply.
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protection is decreased.57
8.2 Intermediate R&D inputs
Let us now look at the case where two R&D stages have to be completed in order
to improve the quality of the good by one step. In the first stage, an intermediate
R&D input (which might be thought of as an idea) has to be invented and this input
is used in the second stage to develop an improved version of the good. The two
stages could as well be interpreted as a research and a development stage. The R&D
technology at each stage is again stochastic and assumed to be of the same form as
in the main model, allowing for preemption due to decreasing R&D productivity at
the industry level. It is assumed that there is full IP protection against imitation in
the final goods market (γ = 0). In the case where IP protection is granted on an
intermediate R&D input, it allows to prevent other firms from using this input, and
therefore from developing a better version of the good. Three cases are considered:
1) No IP protection is granted on intermediate R&D inputs
In this case, the innovation rate is zero as no firm has incentives to invent such an
input.58
2) Both entrants and incumbents can obtain IP protection on intermediate R&D
inputs
Innovation also comes to a halt in this case as incumbents always use the possibility of
obtaining IP protection on the newest input in order to block entry and to eliminate
the threat of being replaced by an entrant.59
3) Only entrants can obtain IP protection on intermediate R&D inputs, but are not
57The assumption that incumbents cannot increase their profit flows by increasing their lead beyond
two steps is certainly unrealistic. However, even in a more general setting with increasing profit
flows, an intermediate strength of IP protection maximizes the average innovation rate in the above-
mentioned cases given that parameters lie within a certain range (see Appendix 2, Section 14 ).
58Once the input is invented, there is free entry into the second stage development race, so that
expected profits for entrants are zero in this race. Expecting this, no entrant has incentives to spend
money on inventing such an intermediate input in the first place. But neither does an incumbent
who has already obtained a two step lead and cannot increase profits further by innovating.
59Given that an incumbent has obtained a two step lead and has also obtained an IPR on the
R&D input which is needed to develop the next version of the good, she uses it to block follow-on
R&D by entrants. If, instead, the entrant has IP protection on the newest version of the input, he
finds it profitable to license it to the incumbent as he values doing follow-on R&D and entering the
market with an improved version of the good less than the leader values blocking follow-on R&D.
Even if entrants are not allowed to license to incumbents, the incumbent can prevent an entrant
from obtaining IP protection on the intermediate R&D input by undertaking a sufficient amount of
research effort in the race for the input.
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allowed to license to incumbents
In this case, sustained innovation is possible, as the incumbent has incentives to pre-
empt entrant R&D at each stage, without ever being able to block future entry com-
pletely. If the input is invented by the incumbent and freely accessible to entrants,
the incumbent has incentives to preempt entry by exerting a large enough effort in the
race for the second R&D stage. Expecting this, she finds inventing the intermediate
input worthwhile (even if she does not obtain IP protection on it), as this prevents
entrants from inventing and obtaining IP protection on it, which would allow them to
replace her in the future. Once the second R&D stage is completed and the incumbent
has developed the next version of the good, the whole process starts again.
8.3 A full-fledged general equilibrium growth model
In the previous sections, a partial equilibrium model was analyzed and the simplifying
assumption was made that increasing the lead beyond two steps does not lead to
larger profit flows. In the supplementary Appendix 2 the more general case of an
endogenous growth model (based on Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)) is analyzed in
which also incumbents with a two step lead can increase profit flows by doing follow-
on R&D. Assuming parameters to be such that each single innovation is non-drastic,
while a two step lead allows the leader to charge the unconstrained monopoly price,
the following results are derived:
As in the simple model, allowing collusion or granting extended lagging breadth
encourages growth, and requiring entrants to pay licensing fees to incumbents, or
granting forward protection reduces growth. It is shown in a welfare analysis that it is
better to reduce innovation incentives in the case where equilibrium growth is excessive
by introducing a price cap than by making profit flows more backloaded. The reason
for this is that monopoly distortions are only reduced in the first case. Given the
same non-obviousness requirement is imposed on entrants and incumbents, it is shown
that growth can be increased if the non-obviousness requirement for entrants (and/or
incumbents with less than the maximal lead) is slightly relaxed. This result is therefore
weaker than that obtained in the simple model.
In the case where incumbents can preempt entry without innovating themselves,
the average growth rate can again be maximal for an intermediate strength of IP
protection, even in the case where innovations are drastic.
The effects that IP policies have on the rate of growth are therefore mainly the
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same as those they have on the rate of innovation in the simplified model
9 Conclusion
While most of the literature analyzing the role of intellectual property rights in models
of cumulative innovation focuses on the case of leapfrogging, this article studies the
case of persistent leadership. This is highly relevant from an empirical perspective,
since most R&D is undertaken by firms that innovate on a permanent basis. Three
main results come out of this analysis: first, non-expiring forward protection reduces
the rate of innovation. Second, imposing a non-obviousness requirement reduces R&D
spending. Both these results differ from the ones obtained in models with leapfrogging.
The third main result is that full uniform protection against imitation, and not state-
dependent IP protection, maximizes the average innovation rate. It is also shown that
the average innovation rate can be increased if forward protection of finite duration
is granted in combination with infinitely lived protection against imitation (a result
that extends to the case of leapfrogging). Moreover, it is shown that if incumbents can
preempt entry without innovating themselves, the average innovation rate is maximal if
protection against imitation expires regularly. The article also analyzes how innovation
can be encouraged if IP protection can be made conditional on whether an innovation
is carried out by an entrant or an incumbent.
The model generates persistent leadership by assuming that innovations are non-
drastic and that incumbents are capable of preempting entry, but - unlike other models
- it does not rely on the assumption that incumbents are more productive in under-
taking R&D than entrants. Within this setting, entry can occur if IP protection has
expired, if entrants and incumbents can collude or sell their IPRs, or if there is ex-
tended lagging breadth. Therefore, the model is also consistent with cases in which
there is less than perfect persistence. If, however, entry occurs because innovations
are drastic, because entrants’ R&D productivity is larger than that of incumbents,
or because preemption is not possible (or not an optimal strategy for incumbents)
due to technological or informational reasons, the leapfrogging model becomes more
appropriate. Therefore, it might be beneficial to use different IPR policies depending
on the degree of persistence of innovative activities in a given sector.60
60Cefis and Orsenigo (2001) and Cefis (2003) provide empirical evidence for the fact that the
persistence of innovative activities depends on technological and industry characteristics.
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Appendix 1: Proofs
A
Proof. In order to determine the equilibrium value φ∗2 of φ2, we need to derive the
level of φ1 chosen by an incumbent with a one step lead. This incumbent takes V2,
and therefore φ∗2, as given and maximizes V1 (= VE) with respect to φ1. Due to
the assumption of constant returns to R&D the analysis is quite simple: as @VE
@φ1
=
⇡2−⇡1−cr−cφ∗2
(r+φ1)2
, we would get the corner solution φ1(φ
∗
2) = φm if
@VE
@φ1
> 0, that means if
φ∗2 <
⇡2−⇡1
c
− r (Condition 1). If φ1 = φm, we obtain φ∗2 = ⇡2c + rφm
(
⇡1
c
− r) − 2r
from the free entry condition (equation (5)), but this is incompatible with Condition
1, as
(
⇡1
c
− r) ⇣1 + r
φm
⌘
< 0 (Condition 2) is violated due to Assumption 2
(
⇡1
r
> c
)
.
Therefore, @VE
@φ1
< 0 holds in equilibrium and an incumbent with a one step lead sets
φ∗1 = φ
∗
2 and only conducts as much R&D as needed to preempt entry
61. As V2 =
⇡2−cφ∗2
r
decreases in φ∗2 and
@V1
@φ1
< 0 in equilibrium, VE decreases in φ
∗
2.
62 Using this
result and implicitly differentiating the free entry condition, we find that φ∗2 increases
in ⇡1 and ⇡2 and decreases in r and c.
B
Proof. Given the incumbent who produces generation k of the good already has a
two step lead, she cannot increase the price and profits by colluding with an entrant,
and simply uses her blocking power to prevent generation k+1 of the good from being
produced. The entrant therefore gets profit flows ⇡1 = 0, but can increase them to
the maximal profit flows ⇡2 in the future if he invents generation k + 2 of the good,
as the incumbent who has IP protection on generation k cannot block the production
of generation k + 2.63 Assuming for the moment that entrants do follow-on R&D in
order to become the next incumbents and then preempt entry to keep their two step
lead, the value of an innovation for an entrant is given by VE =
−cφ1
r+φ1
+ φ1
r+φ1
⇡2−cφ2
r
,
the same as in equation (5), but with ⇡1 replaced by 0. Using the arguments from
61Note that the amount of R&D needed to preempt entry is always given by φ∗2 as the value of an
innovation for an entrant does not depend on the size of the lead of the current leader.
62The same also holds in the case where φ1 = φm, which becomes relevant in later sections.
63Also in the case where the incumbent who has patented generation k only has a one step lead,
the entrant with generation k+1 gets zero profits for the following reason: the incumbent can either
block the entrant and collude with the firm that holds the patent on generation k − 1, or collude
with the entrant and push generation k− 1 out of the market. By making firm k− 1 and the entrant
compete for offers, firm k can therefore extract the whole surplus ⇡2, leaving zero profits for the
entrant.
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the proof of Proposition 1 (Appendix A) and replacing ⇡1 with 0 in Condition 2, we
obtain that now φ∗1 = φm, as the relative profitability of obtaining a two step lead
instead of a one step lead has increased. While entry does not reduce joint profits due
to competition in the product market, it rises R&D above the level that is needed to
preempt entry (as φ∗1 = φm > φ
∗
2), so that joint net profits decrease until the entrant
has advanced to a two step lead. This creates a new sort of ”efficiency effect” due to
which the incumbent values preventing entry more than an entrant values entering.
Therefore, incumbents have incentives to preempt entry completely and there is again
persistent leadership. The equilibrium innovation rate φ∗2 can now be derived from the
free entry condition VE = c, and we obtain φm > φ
∗
2 > 0 if φm >
⇡2
c
− r2
φm
− 2r > 0,
which holds if φm is large and if ⇡2 > 2cr. As VE is lower than in the case without
forward protection (as ⇡1 is replaced by 0), the innovation rate is lower in the case
with forward protection than in the case without.
C
Proof. As expiration of forward protection and innovation occur with the Poisson
arrival rates ⌘ and φ∗N , the expected time span during which the economy remains
in state F (state N) before a switch to the other state occurs is given by 1
⌘
( 1
φ∗
N
), so
that the proportion of time spent in state N is given by ! =
1
φ∗
N
1
⌘
+ 1
φ∗
N
. The average
innovation rate is then given by bφ = !φ∗N = ⌘φ∗N⌘+φ∗
N
. Inserting φ∗N =
⌘⇡2
c(r+⌘)−⇡2 − r and
deriving bφ with respect to ⌘ yields sign@bφ
@⌘
= sign [(⇡2 − rc) (r2 + 2⌘r)− ⌘2rc]. As
the term in square brackets continuously decreases in ⌘ in the admissible range where
⌘ > ⇡2
c
− r, we can derive the expiration rate ⌘∗ = ⇡2
c
− r +
√
⇡2(⇡2−rc)
c
for which the
average innovation rate is maximal by solving the first order condition @
bφ
@⌘
= 0.
D
Proof. Given forward protection and protection against imitation expire with hazard
rate ⌘, the value of an innovation for an entrant is given by VF =
⇡2
r+⌘
. If VF ≥ c,
the innovation rate in state N is therefore given by the corner solution φ∗N = φm, so
that the average innovation rate can be derived as bφ = ⌘φm
⌘+φm
. As bφ increases in ⌘, it
is maximal if ⌘ = ⌘∗ = ⇡2
c
− r, that means if the expiration rate is set at the maximal
level that still induces R&D in state N (and for which VF = c). As bφ also increases
in φm, the maximal value it can reach is therefore given by lim
φm→∞
bφ = ⌘∗ = ⇡2
c
− r.
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However, this is exactly the rate of innovation that can be obtained with extended
lagging breadth if there is no forward protection and if IP protection (which prevents
imitation) is granted for an infinite time.
E
Proof. Let us denote the value of an innovation in state j ∈ {F ;N} for a firm which
has obtained i consecutive innovations by Vij. Taking the fact that entrants expect to
become the next incumbent and to do all follow-on R&D into account, the following
arbitrage conditions need to hold:
rV1F = ⇡1 − cφ∗1F + φ∗1FV2F − ⌘1V1F + ⌘1V1N with either φ∗1F = 0 or φ∗1F = φm
rV1N = ⇡1−cφ∗1N+φ∗1NV2F with either φ∗1N = φ∗2N (preemptive level) or φ∗1N = φm
rV2F = ⇡2 − ⌘2V2F + ⌘2V2N
rV2N = ⇡2 − cφ∗2N + φ∗2NV3F
rViF = ⇡2 − ⌘iViF + ⌘iViN for i < K
rViN = ⇡2 − cφ∗2N + φ∗2NV(i+1)F for i < K
rV F = ⇡2 − ⌘V F + ⌘V N for i ≥ K ≥ 2
rV N = ⇡2 − cφ∗2N + φ∗2NV F for i ≥ K ≥ 2
where V j denotes the value of incumbency for the current incumbent who has
attained K or more consecutive innovations and for whom the rate of expiration of
forward protection in state N is always given by ⌘. Combining the above equations,
we can derive the value of an innovation for an entrant V1F as a negative function of
⌘i
64and of φ∗2N . The preemptive amount φ
∗
2N of R&D that the incumbent undertakes
in equilibrium can be derived from the free entry condition V1F = c, and therefore
depends negatively on ⌘i.
F
Proof. Regime (i): A firm with a one step lead selects R&D effort φ1 = φm if
@VE
@φ1
> 0,
which holds if φ∗2 <
⇡2
c
−r−γ2− ⇡1(r+γ2)c(r+γ1) (Condition 3). Given φ1 = φm, we can solve
the free entry condition (VE = c) for φ
∗
2 to get: φ
∗
2 =
⇡2
c
− r+γ2
φmc
(2cφm + cr + cγ1 − ⇡1).
Plugging this expression into Condition 3 gives the condition φm(⇡1 − cr − cγ1) <
−(r + γ1)(⇡1 − cr − cγ1), which implies that ⇡1 − cr − cγ1 < 0 (Condition 4) must
hold in order to get φ1 = φm. Moreover, the condition φm > φ
∗
2 > 0 must be satisfied
64In case there is a parameter constellation for which φ1F = φ1N = φm > φ
∗
2N , V1F is, however,
independent of ⌘1.
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in order to have an equilibrium. φm > φ
∗
2 is satisfied if φm is large enough, and for φm
large, the condition φ∗2 > 0 holds if
⇡2
c
− 2(r + γ2) > 0 (Condition 5). A firm with a
one step lead therefore only selects R&D effort φ1 = φm if φm is sufficiently large, if
γ1 >
⇡1
c
− r (Condition 4) and if γ2 < ⇡22c − r (Condition 5).
Regimes (ii) and (iii): Given that γ1 ≤ ⇡1c − r (Condition 6), so that Condition
4 does not hold, a firm with a one step lead either undertakes the preemptive R&D
effort φ1 = φ
∗
2 (Regime (ii)) or does not do any R&D ( φ1 = 0, Regime (iii)), in which
case there is leapfrogging. In Regime (ii), the value of an innovation for an entrant
is given by V iiE =
⇡1−cφ2
r+γ1+φ2
+ φ2
r+γ1+φ2
⇡2−cφ2
r+γ2
and in Regime (iii) by V iiiE =
⇡1
r+γ1+φ2
, so
that V iiE > V
iii
E if φ2 <
⇡2
c
− r− γ2 (Condition 7). At the point of indifference where
V iiE = V
iii
E , the free entry condition V
iii
E = c determines the equilibrium innovation
rate as φ∗ = ⇡1
c
− r − γ1 (8). Inserting (8) into Condition 7 we find that in order
to be in Regime (ii) where a firm with a one step lead finds it optimal to do all the
follow-on R&D and to set φ1 = φ
∗
2, the condition γ2 ≤ γ1 + ⇡2−⇡1c must be satisfied.
If γ2 > γ1 +
⇡2−⇡1
c
, the economy is in Regime (iii) where the rate of innovation φ∗ is
given by (8). If Condition 6 holds, the equilibrium innovation rates φ∗ in regime (iii)
and φ∗2 in Regime (ii) are positive (which can be inferred from (8) and the fact that
V iiE > V
iii
E in Regime (ii)).
G
Proof. In Regime (i) where φ∗1 = φm > φ
∗
2 = φ
∗
0, the arrival rate depends on the size of
the lead, which itself changes stochastically over time. In order to calculate the average
innovation rate (arrival rate) in this regime, we need to compute for which fraction
of the time the economy is in which state (on average). To simplify the intuition,
one can also think about a slightly modified version of the model in which there is a
continuum of similar quality-good sectors of mass one, and compute in which fraction
of the sectors the lead is equal to 0, 1 or 2 steps. Denoting the proportion of time
or the fraction of sectors in which the lead is equal to k steps by σk, the following
conditions need to be satisfied in Regime (i) in order to guarantee that the average
entry into state k equals the average exit to other states:
σoφ
∗
2 = γ1σ1 + γ2σ2 (k = 0)
σ1(φm + γ1) = σ0φ
∗
2 (k = 1)
σ2γ2 = σ1φm (k = 2)
The left hand sides stand for the exit from the corresponding states k and the
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right hand sides for the entry into these states. Taking as an example the case where
k = 0, the average fraction of sectors leaving this state is given by the arrival rate of
an innovation in this state (φ∗0 = φ
∗
2) times the fraction of sectors where the state is
given by a lead of zero (σ0). Entry into this state occurs due to the expiration of IP
protection in sectors with a lead of one or two steps and is given by the arrival rate of
IP expiration in the case of a one step lead times the fraction of sectors with a one step
lead (γ1σ1), plus the corresponding expression for k = 2 (γ2σ2). Using the condition
σ0 + σ1 + σ2 = 1 and these three equations, we can compute:
σ0 =
(φm + γ1) γ2
(φm + γ1) γ2 + φ∗2 (γ2 + φm)
(9)
σ1 =
φ∗2γ2
(φm + γ1) γ2 + φ∗2 (γ2 + φm)
(10)
σ2 =
φ∗2φm (φm + γ1) γ2
(φm + γ1) γ2 ((φm + γ1) γ2 + φ∗2 (γ2 + φm))
(11)
The average arrival rate bφi in Regime (i) is now given by the weighted sum of
arrival rates in the different states, with the weights given by σk:
bφi = φmσ1 + φ∗2(σ0 + σ2) = φ∗2 (γ2 (φm + γ1) + φm(φ∗2 + γ2))(φm + γ1) γ2 + φ∗2 (γ2 + φm) (12)
The average arrival rates in regimes (ii) and (iii) are simply given by bφii = φ∗2 andbφiii = φ∗.
Now, the effects of IPR expiration can be analyzed in the different regimes:
Regime (iii): the innovation rate is given as φ∗ = ⇡1
c
− r − γ1 ((8) from Appendix
F ) and clearly decreases in γ1.
In Regime (ii), φ∗2 also decreases in γi, which can be inferred from the free entry
condition V iiE = c as V
ii
E =
⇡1−cφ2
r+γ1+φ2
+ φ2
r+γ1+φ2
⇡2−cφ2
r+γ2
decreases in γi and in φ2.
For the parameter constellation γ2 = γ1+
⇡2−⇡1
c
where the switch between Regimes
(ii) and (iii) occurs, we have V iiE = V
iii
E , and as in both regimes the innovation rate is
not state-dependent and determined by the free entry condition VE = c, there is no
discontinuous jump in the innovation rate at this point.
Regime (i): Solving the free entry condition VE = c for φ
∗
2, we get: φ
∗
2 =
⇡2
c
−
r+γ2
φmc
(2cφm + cr + cγ1 − ⇡1). From this, we obtain @φ
∗
2
@γ1
< 0 and
@φ∗2
@γ2
< 0, given that
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cr+cγ1−⇡1 > 0 (Condition 4 from Appendix F ) holds. The average arrival rate is given
by: bφ = φmσ1 + φ∗2(σ0 + σ2) = φmσ1 + φ∗2(1− σ1). Using σ1 = φ∗2γ2(φm+γ1)γ2+φ∗2(γ2+φm) , we
obtain sign@σ1
@γ1
= sign
n
@φ∗2
@γ1
(φm + γ1) γ2 − φ∗2γ2
o
< 0, so that we get @
bφ
@γ1
= @σ1
@γ1
(φm −
φ∗2) +
@φ∗2
@γ1
(1− σ1) < 0.
Deriving the average arrival rate bφ = φ∗2(γ2(φm+γ1)+φm(φ∗2+γ2))
(φm+γ1)γ2+φ∗2(γ2+φm)
with respect to γ2
gives sign @
bφ
@γ2
=
sign
@φ∗2
@γ2
[(γ2 (φm + γ1) + φm(φ
∗
2 + γ2)) γ2(φm + γ1) + φ
∗
2φm (γ2(φm + γ1) + φ
∗
2(γ2 + φm))]+
φm(φ
∗
2)
2(φm − φ∗2) < 0. This derivative is negative as @φ
∗
2
@γ2
= −2− r+γ1−
⇡1
c
φm
< −2 under
Condition 4. Therefore, setting γ2 = 0 maximizes the average innovation rate. Given
that γ2 = 0, an incumbent who has obtained a two step lead never loses it, so that the
average innovation rate is simply given by bφ = φ∗2, as σ0 = σ1 = 0. But as φ∗2 decreases
in γ1 (because increasing γ1 reduces the value of an innovation for an entrant VE in all
regimes and therefore the amount of R&D the incumbent needs to undertake in order
to preempt entry), the average innovation rate is maximal if γ1 = γ2 = 0.
At the switching point between Regimes (i) and (ii) (where Condition 4 holds with
equality), there is no discontinuity in the value of an innovation for an entrant and
V iE = V
ii
E holds independently of whether entrants set φ1 = φm or φ1 = φ
∗
2. Therefore,
the innovation rates φ∗0 and φ
∗
2 are also the same in both cases. However, the average
innovation rate bφ is higher if firms with a one step lead choose φ1 = φm, so that there
is a discontinuous increase in bφ when a slight shift in parameters leads so a switch
from Regime (ii) to Regime (i).
H
Proof. An incumbent with a two step lead does not do any R&D (φ2 = 0) as this
would only create costs without increasing profit flows beyond the level ⇡2. The value
of having a two step lead is therefore given by V2 =
⇡2
r+γ
and the value of having a one
step lead by V1 =
⇡1−cφ1
r+γ+φ1
+
φ1
⇡2
r+γ
r+γ+φ1
. An incumbent with a one step lead faces no entry
pressure and sets its R&D level equal to φ∗1 = φm if γ ≤ ⇡2−⇡1c −r (as then @V1@φ1 ≥ 0) and
does not do any R&D (φ∗1 = 0) if γ >
⇡2−⇡1
c
− r. In the case where IPRs have expired
and where the currently newest good is in the public domain, the R&D incentives
depend on V1, the value of obtaining a one step lead. If V1 > c, the marginal benefits
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of doing R&D exceed the marginal costs, and at least one firm65 finds it profitable to
do R&D, so that the innovation rate is given by φ∗0 = φm. If γ ≤ ⇡2−⇡1c − r (Case
A), V1 =
⇡1−cφm
r+γ+φm
+
φm
⇡2
r+γ
r+γ+φm
> c holds due to the Arrow replacement effect (⇡2 < 2⇡1)
and we have φ∗0 = φ
∗
1 = φm. If
⇡1
c
− r ≥ γ > ⇡2−⇡1
c
− r (Case B), we get φ∗1 = 0
and φ∗0 = φm, so that incumbents with a one step lead do not do R&D, while firms
undertake R&D if IPRs have expired. If γ > ⇡1
c
− r (Case C), IP protection is so weak
that no firm does R&D even if the newest version of the good is in the public domain,
so that φ∗0 = φ
∗
1 = 0. Denoting the probability to be in a state with a k-step lead by
σk, the average arrival rate of an innovation is given by bφ = σ0φ0+σ1φ1+σ2φ2. It can
be derived from the equations below, in which the expected inflow into state k (left
hand sides) is equal to the expected outflow (right hand sides):
k = 0: γ(σ1 + σ2) = σ0φ
∗
0
k = 1: σ0φ
∗
0 = σ1φ
∗
1 + σ1γ
k = 2: σ1φ
∗
1 = σ2γ = (1− σ0 − σ1)γ
Solving the system of equations for all σk, we obtain bφa = φm(γ2+2γφm)(φm+γ)2 in Case A
and bφb = φmγφm+γ in Case B. In both cases, bφ increases in γ, so that bφ is maximal for the
maximal level of γ that still lies within the admissible parameter range, that means for
γa =
⇡2−⇡1
c
− r > 0 in Case A and for γb = ⇡1c − r > γa in Case B. bφa(γa) > (<) bφb(γb)
if φm(2γa− γb)+ γ2a > (<) 0, that means if φm(
(
2⇡2−3⇡1
c
)− r)+ (⇡2−⇡1
c
− r)2 > (<)0.
65As marginal R&D costs go to infinity if φ = φm, average R&D costs rise in total R&D spending
and there is entry up to the point where these average costs are equal to V1.
Even though there is the upper bound on the total arrival rate φm, the free entry condition can be
satisfied with equality if firms in the aggregate undertake more R&D than necessary to obtain φm,
so that average costs increase above c. This can happen if the individual probability of obtaining an
IPR (patent) depends on the ratio between individual and total R&D spending.
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Appendix 2: Increasing profit flows
This section studies a more general setup in which even firms with a two step lead
can increase their profits by conducting R&D. Like in Denicolo` (2001), the analysis is
based on a one-sector version of the growth model of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995,
Chapter 7).
11 Model setup and equilibrium
The economy is populated by identical individuals of mass one who inelastically supply
one unit of labour. Intertemporal preferences are given by U(⌧) =
∞Z
t=⌧
c (t) e−⇢(t−⌧)dt
with c(t) denoting consumption in period t. There is a final good y which can be
consumed, used for research or used one-for-one to produce intermediate goods xi, of
which there exist generations i ∈ {1, ..., k}. The final good is produced using labour
(which is in fixed supply) and intermediate goods according to the following production
function: yk = X
↵
k , with Xk =
kX
i=0
qixi and 0 < ↵ < 1. q
i indicates the quality of
the intermediate good of generation i, and innovation allows the introduction of new
intermediate goods, the quality of which is increased by the factor q > 1 compared to
the previous generation.
The final good sector is assumed to be competitive, while intermediate goods can
be protected by IPRs. Since different generations of intermediate goods are perfect
substitutes, only the best quality (the newest generation) is used in equilibrium, so
that the final good production function reduces to yk = q
k↵x↵k . In equilibrium, the
rate of interest r coincides with the rate of time preference ⇢. Normalizing the price of
the final good to one, the demand for the latest generation of the intermediate good
as a function of its price pk can be derived as
xk = ↵
1
1−↵ q
k↵
1−↵p
− 1
1−↵
k (13)
In a stationary equilibrium, pk is constant and from (13) and the production func-
tion it follows that the growth factor between two innovations in terms of the final
good is given by g ≡ yk+1
yk
= q
↵
1−↵ .
Given the newest innovation (generation k of the intermediate good) is protected
by an intellectual property right, its price is set in order to maximize profits ⇡k =
(pk − 1) xk. If innovations are drastic or if the lead of the leading firm is so large (due
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to successive innovations or collusive agreements with the closest competitors) that no
competitor can profitably underprice her, the (unconstrained) monopoly price, which
is given by pM = 1
↵
, is charged. Monopoly profits are then given as:
⇡Mk = ↵
2
1−↵
✓
1
↵
− 1
◆
q
k↵
1−↵ (14)
which can also be written as ⇡Mk = ⇡
Mgk with ⇡M ≡ ↵ 1+↵1−↵ (1− ↵).
Innovations are therefore drastic if q ≥ 1
↵
. In the case where innovations are
non- drastic (q < 1
↵
) and the last generation of the quality good is available to a
competitor, there is limit pricing and the leader charges a price equal to its quality
advantage pc = q < pM in order to keep competitors out of the market. In this case
profits are given by
⇡Ck = ↵
1
1−↵ (q − 1) q k↵1−↵ q− 11−↵ (15)
which can also be written as ⇡Ck = ⇡
Cgk where ⇡C ≡ ↵ 11−↵ (q − 1) q− 11−↵ .
In the following, it is assumed that ↵q2 ≥ 1 ≥ ↵q (Assumption 3), which implies
that each single innovation is non-drastic, but that a two step lead allows the leader
to charge the unconstrained monopoly price. ⇡Ck and ⇡
M
k can therefore be interpreted
as profits of firms with a one step and a two (or more) step lead.66 Compared to the
simple model used in the article, the main difference is therefore that these profits
grow by the factor g when an innovation takes place.
R&D can be undertaken by using the final good as an input. The arrival rate of
the k + 1 th innovation is given by φ(k + 1) = min
⇢⇣
n
cgk
⌘ 1
1+✏
,φm
}
, where n denotes
the total amount of the final good used in the R&D sector and ✏ ≥ 0. φm again sets an
upper bound which the arrival rate cannot surpass due to technological reasons. The
difference of this specification compared to that in the simple model is that R&D costs
n(φ) increase from generation to generation. This assumption is needed to offset the
effect of increasing profit flows and to obtain a balanced growth path with a constant
innovation arrival rate. It is again assumed that all firms have access to the same R&D
technology and that there is free entry into the R&D sector. In the following part of
the analysis it is assumed that an innovator obtains IP protection of infinite duration
that prevents others from producing her generation of the good, and that there is no
66If a price cap q < p < 1
↵
is imposed, profits of firms with a two- (or more-) step lead are decreased,
but ⇡Ck < ⇡
M
k still holds.
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forward protection and that voluntary deals like collusion are not permitted.
As profit flows grow with each innovation, even incumbents might gain from inno-
vating in this setup, and it is not as clear as in the simple model whether entrants or
incumbents have the larger stand-alone innovation incentives.
Lemma 3 Given Assumption 3, incremental (stand-alone) profit flows of incumbents
with a two step lead are lower than those for entrants and incumbents with a one step
lead (Arrow replacement effect).
Proof. See Appendix X (at the end of this section)
As R&D productivity is decreasing at the industry level (✏ ≥ 0), incumbents can
again preempt entry, and as they value not being replaced more than entrants value
entry, they do all the R&D, so that there is again persistent leadership. Due to the
Arrow replacement effect, incumbents with a two step lead only conduct as much
R&D as necessary to prevent entry, so that the equilibrium innovation rate is again
determined by a free entry condition and depends on the value of an innovation for
an entrant expecting to become the new incumbent after entry.
For reasons of tractability, the analysis again focuses on the limit case where ✏ → 0.
The expected value V2(k) of having a two step lead and supplying generation k of the
intermediate good can now be derived from the following arbitrage condition:
rV2(k) = ⇡
Mgk − φ2cgk − φ2V2(k) + φ2V2(k + 1)
The last terms on the right hand side indicate that, if an innovation occurs with the
arrival rate φ2, the firm stops supplying generation k and starts supplying generation
k + 1 of the good. Taking into account that V2(k + 1) = gV2(k) along a balanced
growth path, this condition can be rewritten as
V2(k) = g
k ⇡
M − φ2c
r − φ2 (g − 1) (16)
A balanced growth path, however, only exists if the denominator is positive, which
is the case if r > φ∗2(g− 1) (Condition 9). The expected value V1(k) of getting a one
step lead and supplying generation k of the intermediate good (which coincides with
the value of an innovation for an entrant VE(k)) can be derived from the arbitrage
condition:
rV1(k) = ⇡
Cgk − φ1cgk − φ1V1(k) + φ1V2(k + 1)
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Inserting V2(k + 1) = g
k+1 ⇡M−φ2c
r−φ2(g−1) from (16), we can solve for
V1(k) = g
k
 
⇡C − φ1c
r + φ1
+
φ1
r + φ1
g
(
⇡M − φ2c
)
r − φ2 (g − 1)
!
(17)
The terms φ1 and φ2 again denote the innovation arrival rates chosen by firms
with a one and a two step lead, which turn out to be independent of k. As the value
that the invention of the k th generation of the intermediate good has for an entrant
is given by V1(k), and as the innovation costs in the case where the current version
of the intermediate good has quality k − 1 are given by n = cgk−1φ, the free entry
condition is given by V1(k) = cg
k−1, which can be written as:
⇡C − φ∗1c
r + φ∗1
+
φ∗1
r + φ∗1
g
(
⇡M − φ∗2c
)
r − φ∗2 (g − 1)
=
c
g
(18)
This condition is similar to that obtained in the simple model, with the difference
that there is the growth factor g (an increase in g increases equilibrium growth) and
that ⇡1 and ⇡2 are replaced by ⇡
C and ⇡M . In order to determine the value of φ∗1, we
again need to determine how the value of an innovation for an entrant V1(k) depends on
φ1. Deriving (17), we find that sign
@V1(k)
@φ1
= sign
{
φ∗2⇡
C(g − 1)− ⇡Cr + gr⇡M − cr2 − crφ∗2
 
,
which is independent of φ1. Like in the simple model, we therefore have φ
∗
1 = φm if
sign
@V1(k)
@φ1
> 0 and φ∗1 = φ
∗
2 if sign
@V1(k)
@φ1
≤ 0. The equilibrium rate of growth φ∗2 can
then be determined from the free entry condition (18) once the appropriate value of
φ∗1 is inserted.
12 The effects of IP policies
As there is persistent leadership and as incumbents only do as much R&D as needed to
preempt entry, growth depends positively on entry pressure, i.e. on the value that an
innovation has for an entrant. As in the simple model, the value of an innovation for an
entrant increases if the profits of firms with a one step lead (⇡Cgk) increase. Therefore,
allowing voluntary deals that permit entrants to consolidate market power with
previous incumbents and to avoid the phase of competition again increases growth.
Requiring entrants to pay licensing fees upon entry, in order to compensate
previous incumbents, reduces the value of an innovation for an entrant and growth,
like in the simple model, as entrants expect to become the next leaders and never to
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receive any licensing payments from others in the future.67
The analysis of forward protection in this setup is also very similar, but now
collusion allows to increase joint profits by using the entrants’ superior production
technology. If an entrant has invented generation k + 1 of the quality good, the
incumbent can still obtain the previous profit flows ⇡Mgk if she does not permit the
entrant to produce, but if she negotiates with the entrant in order to obtain access to
the new technology, joint profit flows can be increased to ⇡Mgk+1. If collusion does not
allow coordinating joint R&D expenditures, forward protection again reduces growth.
The reason for this is that the entrant can maximally (if he has all the bargaining
power) get the additional profits (gk+1 − gk)⇡M resulting from his innovation until
he advances to a two step lead. But these additional profits are, due to the Arrow
replacement effect, lower than the profit ⇡Cgk+1 which he would get without forward
protection in the phase of competition.68 Forward protection therefore decreases the
value of an innovation for an entrant and equilibrium growth.69
As increasing ⇡C increases the value of an innovation for an entrant, entry pressure
is maximal if entrants get the maximal possible profit flows ⇡Mgk immediately upon
entry. And this can again be obtained through extended lagging breadth. There-
fore (not considering the possibility of forward protection of limited duration) growth
is again maximized if there is extended lagging breadth.70
67Even if there was leapfrogging (because incumbents do not have ideas for R&D), it is not possible
to increase innovation incentives by making licensing fees grow sufficiently over time. The reason for
this is that licensing fees can maximally grow in line with profits (otherwise there would be a Ponzi
game), but that the interest rate in equilibrium has to be at least as large as this expected rate of
profit growth, so that discounted profits cannot increase if licensing fees are introduced.
68It is again assumed that collusion is not feasible or allowed if there is no forward protection.
69It is important to note that the result that innovation incentives are increased if a larger share of
total profits is allocated to entrants at the expense of previous innovators depends on the assumption
made in quality-ladder models that each innovation builds on a previous innovation. If there is,
however, an initial product innovation, on which all following innovations build, the incentives to
come up with this initial innovation clearly decrease if follow-on innovators can easily replace the
initial innovator without any compensation. There is therefore a trade-off for patent policy in such
a case, and encouraging initial R&D (by requiring entrants to compensate previous inventors with
licensing fees, by granting forward protection or by forbidding ex post collusion) comes at the cost of
reducing follow-on R&D (see Chu, Cozzi and Galli (2012) and also Denicolo` (2002)).
70Llanes and Trento (forthcoming) analyze a product-variety setting in which new innovations
build on the knowledge incorporated in all previously invented goods. They show that, for a given
level of appropriability in the final goods markets, a transfer system which grants a subsidy to each
newly entering innovator, and taxes the previously newest innovator, grants the optimal innovation
incentives. Even in this different setting, making older innovations infringe on the newest one could
be a way to implement such a transfer system. In order to reduce transaction costs associated
with licensing and to grant the maximal possible profits to entrants, one could also more directly
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In quality ladder models like the one studied here, an increase in the rate of growth
might, however, not always be welfare-improving, as equilibrium growth might be
excessive for certain parameter values71. However, this does not imply that a good
way to reduce growth is to make profit flows more backloaded or to discourage entry
by reducing ⇡C if the policy maker can instead impose a price cap equal to p < 1
↵
on
incumbents.72 Such a price cap decreases profits ⇡Mgk of firms with a two step lead and
therefore also the value of an innovation for an entrant and the rate of growth, but at
the same time it reduces monopoly distortions stemming from IP protection, which is
not the case if entry pressure is reduced by reducing ⇡C , or in another way which does
not affect ⇡M . As there is persistent leadership, intermediate goods are only supplied
by incumbents with a two (or more) step lead, so that monopoly distortions only
depend on the price charged by firms with a two step lead and not on the hypothetical
price that would arise in a phase of competition where a firm has a one step lead.
Reducing the price and profits ⇡C of firms with a one step lead therefore only reduces
entry pressure and growth without reducing monopoly distortions. We can therefore
state:
Proposition 8 In the case where innovation is excessive, it is better (in terms of
social welfare) to reduce innovation incentives by limiting the maximal price p that
firms with the maximal lead can charge than by reducing entry pressure in another
way (like by reducing ⇡1, imposing entry fees etc.)
Proof. See Appendix Y
”expropriate” previous innovators by allocating their patents (that generate profits by preventing
imitation of a certain final good) to the most recent inventor. Such policies would, however, only
work (contrary to the case of subsidies) if there is an initial stock of patents the profits of which can
be allocated to the first innovator without the need to compensate the initial owners (the same holds
true in the quality-ladder case).
71If an increase in growth is obtained at the cost of a decrease in current consumption arising from
larger monopoly distortions, welfare might rise or fall. Denicolo` (2001) gives numerical examples for
both cases.
In the case where ✏ > 0, there is a further effect (beside the ”business stealing effect” that can
arise in quality ladder models) through which overall innovation incentives might become excessive:
if R&D productivity decreases at the industry level and there is free entry, firms do not take the fact
that their R&D activity also increases the costs of other firms into account, so that more R&D is
undertaken than in the case where entrants maximize their joint profits. Put differently, entry occurs
until the value of an innovation is equal to the average and not the marginal costs of innovating, and
this condition is satisfied for a larger overall amount of R&D. This effect is the same as that analyzed
in the well-known problem of the ”tragedy of the commons”.
72This could also be done through patent policy, by allowing a competitive fringe to produce copied
versions of the good that have higher production costs or a lower quality. Incumbents would then
have to cut their price in order to prevent entry.
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It is therefore optimal to make profit flows as frontloaded as possible and to set ⇡C
equal to ⇡M like in the case of extended lagging breadth.73
13 Minimal inventive step
Let us now assume that the amount of the final good ni that a firm i needs to use
as a research input in order to improve the quality q of the current generation of the
intermediate good by the factor µi ( > 1) and to obtain the arrival rate φi, is given by
ni = cq
↵
1−↵φiλ(µi)(ntot)
✏, with @λ(µ)
@µ
> 0 and with ntot = ni+n−i indicating the overall
(industry-wide) amount of the final good which is used in R&D. The only difference
between this specification and that in the simple model is that R&D costs are assumed
to grow at the same rate as output (note that y = Kq
↵
1−↵ with K constant) in order
to obtain a balanced growth path. Again, all that matters for preemption is therefore
the total amount of resources used for R&D. As long as the incumbent values not
being replaced more than entrants value entry, she therefore preempts entry, and if
her stand-alone innovation incentives are lower than those of entrants, she just does as
much R&D as needed to preempt entry. In this case, entry pressure and growth can
again be increased if the non-obviousness requirement for entrants and incumbents
with a one step lead is relaxed (if it was binding before). As Lemma 3 proves the
existence of the Arrow replacement effect if innovative steps are equal for entrants and
incumbents (with the notation µ = q), we know that there is preemption and that
incumbents conduct all R&D in equilibrium if both entrants and incumbents (with a
two step lead) face the same binding non-obviousness requirement. We can therefore
state:
Proposition 9 Suppose the same binding non-obviousness requirement is imposed on
entrants and incumbents. Growth can then be increased if the non-obviousness re-
quirement for entrants and/or incumbents with less than the maximal lead is slightly
relaxed.
It is, however, not so clear whether there is still persistent leadership if a consider-
ably stronger non-obviousness requirement is imposed on incumbents than on entrants,
as this might render preemption too costly (and even more so, if voluntary deals are
73The possibility of introducing forward protection of limited duration in order to achieve an even
higher average rate of growth is not considered here. If it was introduced, full frontloading would,
however, still be optimal in the case where forward protection has expired (the arguments being the
same as in the case of the simple model).
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possible after entry occurs). If incumbents tend to pursue smaller inventive steps than
entrants, it is also possible that a (weak) non-obviousness requirement only binds for
incumbents but not for entrants, so that relaxing it for entrants might not lead to
increased entry pressure.
14 Perfect preemption
If a monopolist can preempt entry without innovating herself for the reasons discussed
in sections 8.1.1 and 8.1.2, and if the entire stock of IPRs expires with hazard rate γ,
the effects that IP protection has on growth are again similar to those it has on the
innovation rate in the basic model:
Proposition 10 Under the conditions ⇡
M (g−1)
r
< c and ⇡cg > c (r + γ), the equilib-
rium innovation rates φ∗i in the case of an i step lead are given by φ
∗
0 = φ
∗
1 = φm and
φ∗2 = 0 if ⇡
Mg > ⇡c + c (r + γ), while they are given by φ∗0 = φm and φ
∗
1 = φ
∗
2 = 0 if
⇡Mg < ⇡c + c (r + γ). In both cases, average growth bφ is maximal for an intermediate
strength of IP protection 0 < γ < ∞.
Given that ⇡
M (g−1)
r+γ
> c and φm <
r+γ
g−1 , we obtain φ
∗
0 = φ
∗
1 = φ
∗
2 = φm =
bφ
Proof. See Appendix Z
The only difference to the simple model is therefore that there is a parameter range
(⇡
M (g−1)
r+γ
> c) in which the firm keeps innovating even if it has surpassed a two step
lead, and in which the innovation rate is always at its maximal level φm.
Let us now look at the case where innovations are drastic (i.e. where q > 1
↵
)
and where there is only a single firm capable of doing R&D. If the IPR on the newest
generation of the good is protected, this firm is a monopolist, charges the unconstrained
monopoly price and makes profits ⇡Mgk. Such a monopolist does not find it profitable
to do follow-on R&D if ⇡
M (g−1)
r+γ
< c (see Appendix Z ). If, however, ⇡
M
r+γ
> c, the
firm wants to innovate, given that IP protection on the currently newest generation
has expired. Therefore, average growth can again be maximal for an intermediate
strength of IP protection. Given that ⇡
M (g−1)
r
< c, innovation only takes place if IPRs
have expired, so that average growth is maximal if γ = ⇡
M
c
− r, as this strength still
guarantees that firms find it profitable to do the maximal amount φ = φm of R&D
when IPRs have expired while it maximizes the probability that the economy is in this
state.74
74While this article only analyzes the effects of protecting innovators from direct imitation (copying)
by competitors, it does not address the more general question of the optimal breadth of IP protection
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Appendix X
Proof. If an incumbent with a two step lead innovates, she obtains profit flows ⇡Mgk+1
instead of the previous profit flows that were given by ⇡Mgk. Incumbents with a one
step lead also obtain profit flows ⇡Mgk+1 if they innovate, but these replace the lower
one step lead profit flows that were given by ⇡Cgk. Therefore, incumbents with a
one step lead have larger stand-alone innovation incentives than incumbents with a
two step lead (as ⇡M(gk+1 − gk) < ⇡Mgk+1 − ⇡Cgk due to the fact that ⇡M > ⇡C).
Entrants gain ⇡Cgk+1 if they innovate (and do not lose any previous profits) and their
stand-alone innovation incentives are larger than those of incumbents with a two step
lead if ⇡Cgk+1 > ⇡M(gk+1 − gk), that means if ⇡M
⇡C
< g
g−1 (Condition 10). It is now
shown that this condition holds under Assumption 3 (↵q2 ≥ 1 ≥ ↵q), so that there is
again the well-known Arrow replacement effect:
Replacing ⇡M , ⇡C and g by their values, Condition 10 implies that ↵
↵
1−↵ (1− ↵) <
q−1
q
⇣
q
↵
1−↵−1
⌘ (i). This inequality is satisfied for the largest feasible value of q which is
given by qmax =
1
↵
due to Assumption 3. If the right hand side (RHS) of (i) decreases
in q, (i) therefore always holds. @RHS
@q
< 0 holds if 1 − ↵ > q ↵1−↵ − ↵q 11−↵ ≡ R (ii).
We have @R
@q
< 0 so that (ii) always holds if it holds for the smallest feasible value of q
which is given by qmin =
1√
↵
(due to Assumption 3). Inserting q = qmin into (ii) gives
the inequality ↵ + ↵−
↵
2(1−↵) − ↵ 1−2↵2(1−↵) < 1 (iii). This condition (iii) is satisfied with
equality if ↵ = 1. Using simulations it can be shown that (iii) is strictly satisfied if
0 < ↵ < 1. Therefore, ⇡
M
⇡C
< g
g−1 holds given that ↵q
2 ≥ 1 ≥ ↵q and 0 < ↵ < 1.
Appendix Y
Proof. Denoting the current generation of the quality good by k, consumption is
given by c(k) = yk − xk − cgkφ∗, where the last term stands for the R&D spending
in terms of the final good. Inserting yk = q
k↵x↵k and xk = ↵
1
1−↵ q
k↵
1−↵p−
1
1−↵ , we obtain
c(k) = gk
⇣
↵
↵
1−↵p−
↵
1−↵ − ↵ 11−↵p− 11−↵ − cφ∗
⌘
, which can be shown to decrease in p (given
if substitutable but differentiated goods can be invented. While granting IP protection on such
goods tends to increase the incentives to invent them or to increase their quality, it creates direct
competitors for the initial good and reduces the profits that inventors can earn if they improve the
quality of this initial good. If two differentiated goods are very substitutable so that consumers do
not benefit much from consuming both of them instead of only one, it is clearly more efficient if R&D
is only undertaken to (continuously) increase the quality of one of the two goods and not of both
goods at the same time. The costly invention of closely substitutable goods that do not have a higher
quality than an existing good could be discouraged by making these inventions infringe on the IPR
of the newest generation of the existing good.
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that p > 1).
Along a balanced growth path75, consumption, the input of intermediate goods and
R&D investment all grow by the factor g when an innovation occurs, and expected
intertemporal utility is given by W (k) = gk c(k)
⇢−φ∗(g−1) . The equilibrium rate of growth
φ∗ can be increased if either ⇡c or ⇡M , which is a positive function of p, are increased.
If a given rate of growth can be obtained with different combinations of ⇡c and ⇡M , it
is therefore always welfare-improving to choose the combination for which ⇡C is max-
imal and for which ⇡M and therefore p are as low as possible, as this minimizes the
deadweight losses associated with IP policy and maximizes consumption and intertem-
poral utility, given the targeted rate of innovation. Entry pressure should therefore be
kept as high as possible to push incumbents to innovate, and if the equilibrium rate
of growth turns out to be excessive, it should be reduced by decreasing the market
power of incumbents, but not by making entry more difficult.
Appendix Z
Proof. The value of a monopolist who produces generation k of the good, is two steps
ahead, and innovates at the rate φ2, can be determined from the arbitrage condition
rV2(k) = ⇡
Mgk − φ2cgk − φ2V2(k) + φ2V2(k + 1)− γV2(k)
and is therefore given by
V2(k) =
⇡Mgk − φ2cgk + φ2V2(k + 1)
r + φ2 + γ
(19)
Taking V2(k + 1) as given, the innovation rate φ
∗
2 which maximizes V2(k) is given
by
φ∗2 =
8>>><>>>:
φm if V2(k + 1) > g
k
⇣
⇡M
r+γ
+ c
⌘
∈ [0;φm] if V2(k + 1) = gk
⇣
⇡M
r+γ
+ c
⌘
0 if V2(k + 1) < g
k
⇣
⇡M
r+γ
+ c
⌘ (20)
Assuming that the firm chooses innovation rate eφ2 after obtaining innovation k+1,
we can use (19) and the fact that V2(k + 1) = gV2(k) along a balanced growth path,
75In this model, there are no transition dynamics and the economy jumps to a new steady state
immediately, so that the welfare analysis boils down to a comparison of steady state utilities.
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to derive
V2(k + 1) =
⇡Mgk+1 − eφ2cgk+1
r + eφ2(1− g) + γ (21)
where eφ2 < r+γg−1 needs to hold (Condition 9a)
Inserting (21) into (20), we obtain that for any eφ2,
φ∗2 =
8><>:
φm if
⇡M (g−1)
r+γ
> c
∈ [0;φm] if ⇡
M (g−1)
r+γ
= c
0 if ⇡
M (g−1)
r+γ
< c
(22)
so that (22) determines the innovation rate which a monopolist with a two step lead
chooses for any quality level k in order to maximize expected profits. If ⇡
M (g−1)
r+γ
> c
and φm <
r+γ
g−1 (Condition 9a), the equilibrium innovation rate in the case of an i step
lead is therefore always given by φ∗i = φm, as incentives to innovate are even higher
in the case of a zero or one step lead than in the case of a two step lead according to
Lemma 3.
Let us now assume that ⇡
M (g−1)
r
< c (Condition 11), so that a monopolist who
can preempt entry without doing R&D herself actually finds it optimal not to do any
R&D once she has reached a two step lead, even if IPRs are fully protected (γ = 0).
The value of having a one step lead is then given by V1(k) =
⇡cgk−φ1cgk+φ1V2(k+1)
r+φ1+γ
,
with V2(k + 1) =
⇡Mgk+1
r+γ
. A monopolist with a one step lead finds it profitable to
do R&D and sets φ∗1 = φm if
@V1(k)
@φ1
> 0, which is the case if ⇡Mg > ⇡c + c (r + γ)
(Condition 12). Given IPRs have expired and no firm has a lead over its rivals, firms
always find it profitable to undertake R&D if ⇡cg > c (r + γ) (Condition 13), as
this condition ensures that R&D pays off even if a firm stops to innovate after having
obtained a one step lead. Condition 11 is compatible with Condition 12 because
⇡M(g − 1) < cr < c(r + γ) < ⇡Mg − ⇡c (as ⇡M > ⇡c) and it is also compatible with
Condition 13 as ⇡M(g − 1) < cr < c(r + γ) < ⇡cg due to Condition 10
⇣
⇡M
⇡c
< g
g−1
⌘
.
If parameters are such that Conditions 11, 12, and 13 hold, the monopolist therefore
does not do any R&D when she has a two step lead, while the maximal amount of
R&D is undertaken in the case of a one step lead, and also if IPRs have expired and no
firm has a lead. If IPRs are fully protected (γ = 0), long run growth is therefore zero,
as the monopolist stops innovating after having reached a two step lead. Reducing
IP protection (increasing γ) up to the level that is still compatible with Conditions
12 and 13 therefore increases average growth as it increases the probability of being
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in a state where IPRs have expired or where there is a one step lead and in which
innovation is maximal. Even if only Conditions 11 and 13 hold, so that the monopolist
stops innovating after having reached a one step lead, the reasoning is the same and
average growth is maximal for an intermediate strength of IP protection (the maximal
γ that is compatible with Condition 13).
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